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ABSTRACT
Ranking items by their probability of relevance has long been the
goal of conventional ranking systems. While this maximizes tradi-
tional criteria of ranking performance, there is a growing under-
standing that it is an oversimplification in online platforms that
serve not only a diverse user population, but also the producers
of the items. In particular, ranking algorithms are expected to be
fair in how they serve all groups of users – not just the majority
group – and they also need to be fair in how they divide exposure
among the items. These fairness considerations can partially be
met by adding diversity to the rankings, as done in several recent
works, but we show in this paper that user fairness, item fairness
and diversity are fundamentally different concepts. In particular,
we find that algorithms that consider only one of the three desider-
ata can fail to satisfy and even harm the other two. To overcome
this shortcoming, we present the first ranking algorithm that ex-
plicitly enforces all three desiderata. The algorithm optimizes user
and item fairness as a convex optimization problem which can be
solved optimally. From its solution, a ranking policy can be derived
via a new Birkhoff-von Neumann decomposition algorithm that
optimizes diversity. Beyond the theoretical analysis, we provide a
comprehensive empirical evaluation on a new benchmark dataset
to show the effectiveness of the proposed ranking algorithm on
controlling the three desiderata and the interplay between them.
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1 INTRODUCTION
We consider ranking problems that involve two-sided markets of
producers and consumers. Such two-sided markets are widespread
in online platforms — movie producers and audiences in a stream-
ing platform, job seekers and employers in a resume database, or
news agencies and information seekers in a news-feed app. In these
two-sided markets, the items compete with each other for exposure
to the users, while the users gain utility from the recommender
system by finding items they like. The platform mediates this mar-
ket through the ranking algorithm, with great influence on which
users get exposed to which items.
Conventional ranking algorithms maximize the average utility to
the users by following the probability ranking principle (PRP) [49].
However, there is growing understanding that this is an oversim-
plification in online platforms that mediate a two-sided market.
First, the objective of maximizing the average utility can unfairly
marginalize minority user groups, decreasing how useful the rank-
ing system is to them in order to better serve a majority user group
[62]. Second, the items compete with each other for exposure to
the users, and there is the need to divide the exposure between
the items in a fair way. It was shown that maximizing the average
utility to the users can be unfair to the items, and that it can lead
to winner-takes-all dynamics that amplify existing inequities [54].
Violating user and/or item fairness is not only ethically fraught
for many applications, it may also drive users and items from the
platform [25], or violate anti-discrimination law [41], anti-trust
law [53], or freedom of speech principles [28].
Diversification of search results has often been employed to
address these concerns, as well as related issues like super-star
economics [38, 51], perpetuation of stereotypes [9, 32], ideological
polarization [5, 6] and spread of misinformation [59, 61]. However,
while diversification appears related to fairness at first glance, it
is not clear whether standard formalizations of diversity [36, 47]
actually achieve fairness and vice versa.
In this paperwe provide the first theoretical study of the interplay
between user fairness, item fairness and diversity for rankings in
two-sided markets. To enable this theoretical analysis, we quantify
the three desiderata in an intent-aware setup [2, 22, 23] where users
have different intents and items have varying relevance to different
intents. In particular, we formalize user fairness as an economic
social-welfare objective where user groups differ in their intent
distributions, and relate this to submodular diversity objectives.
For item fairness, we adapt the disparate treatment constraints
proposed in [54] for the intent-aware setup to ensure the exposure
is fairly allocated to the item groups based on their merit. Through
this theoretical analysis, we show that user fairness, item fairness
and diversity are independent goals. Specifically, algorithms that
optimize any one of the desiderata can fail to satisfy and even harm
the other two.
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To address this problem, we present the first ranking algorithm
that explicitly enforces all three desiderata – called TSFD Rank for
Two-Sided Fairness and Diversity. The algorithm optimizes user
and item fairness as a convex optimization problem which can be
solved optimally. From its solution, a ranking policy can be derived
via a new Birkhoff-von Neumann decomposition [12] algorithm
that optimizes diversity.
In addition to the theoretical analysis, we constructed the first
benchmark dataset with annotations for intents, user groups and
item groups. On this dataset, which we will make publicly available,
we empirically evaluate the proposed TSFD Rank against several
baselines, quantifying the dependencies between user fairness, item
fairness and diversity.
2 RELATEDWORK
As algorithmic techniques make more and more decisions that in-
volve human beings, there is growing interest in understanding
their societal impact. Many works proposed mathematical desider-
ata to test algorithmic fairness in binary classification [7]. These
desiderata often operationalize definitions of fairness from political
philosophy and sociology. We study the societal impact of a less
explored problem of ranking which, unlike binary classification,
is a structured output prediction problem with an exponentially
large output space. Since users have different preferences and items
compete for exposure in the rankings, the fairness definitions in
binary classification do not directly translate to rankings.
The source of unfairness in rankings can be divided into two
kinds. Some works focus on the endogenous design of the fair
ranking systems [54, 64]. They aim to answer what a fair ranking
system is and how to achieve fairness assuming all the system
information such as the relevance and position bias are known. The
second source of unfairness comes from exogenous factors such
as biases in the data [13, 30, 48, 65] and biases during relevance
estimation [17, 66]. Some works take both into consideration [63,
69]. We focus on the endogenous design of fair and diverse rankings
in two-sided markets, which is orthogonal to exogenous factors.
Most existing works on fairness in rankings consider item fair-
ness. They can be classified into three types: (1) composition-based
item fairness which ensures statistical parity of where the items
are ranked [4, 20, 21, 27, 57, 64, 68], (2) pairwise-comparison-based
item fairness which aims for statistical parity of pairwise ranking
errors between item groups [10, 31, 40], (3) exposure-based item
fairness which explicitly quantifies the amount of exposure an item
gets in a ranking and allocates exposure to the items based on their
merit [11, 38, 39, 52, 54, 55]. We adopt the third type of item fairness
since (1) unlike composition-based item fairness, it can allocate ex-
posure based on merit; (2) unlike pairwise-comparison-based item
fairness, it takes position bias into consideration; and (3) it explicitly
quantifies the amount of exposure an item gets in a ranking which
enables the quantifiable study of the relationship of item fairness
to the other desiderata.
Few works consider user fairness in rankings and they consider
user unfairness problems that result from achieving item fairness
across different queries. Some works [8, 42] aim to fairly share the
utility drop among the user groups when achieving item fairness
across queries. Patro et al. [43] regard the drastic change of exposure
to the items during the policy updates to be unfair and proposed an
online update algorithm to smoothly update the policy so that the
exposure to the items changes gradually while ensuring a minimum
utility for the users during the policy updates. In contrast, we
identify user unfairness problem originating from the user intent
difference and uncertainty for an individual query which exists
even when we do not consider item fairness. Some works consider
user fairness in group recommendation, where a recommendation
needs to satisfy a group of users with different preferences [62].
They assume the relevance of each item to each user is known. We
model the user preferences and the associated uncertainty in an
intent-aware setup.
Diversity in rankings and recommendations also challenges the
PRP. The key mechanism behind diversity is to model utility as
a function that is not modular (i.e. linearly additive) in the set
of ranked items, but that exhibits a diminishing-returns property
— most commonly in the form of a submodular set function [22,
47, 67]. In extrinsic diversity [19, 47, 70], this is used to hedge
against the uncertainty about the user’s information need, and in
intrinsic diversity [23, 46] this is used to model complementarity
and substitution in a sense of portfolio optimization. Since we
are dealing with uncertain intents, our goal is to achieve extrinsic
diversity for the rankings.
Two-sided platforms are modeled as matchmakers that reduce
the friction between the two sides of the market. The key to the
success of two-sided platforms is to ensure a critical mass of partic-
ipants on both sides, since they are in need of each other. Literature
in economics [3, 18, 25, 50] focuses on the the effect of business
strategies, primarily about pricing, on the two-sided markets but
typically does not model the effect that the platform’s ranking al-
gorithm has on the interactions between users and items. Recently,
some works [1, 16] advocate viewing recommendation problem
in the context of two-sided markets and discussed fairness issues
on both sides. But neither mathematical definitions nor theoretical
characterizations of fairness were provided.
The algorithmic study of two-sided matching markets dates back
to the stable matching algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley [26].
Some works proposed algorithms in this context to select a fair sta-
ble matching from a set of stable matchings [33, 37]. Recently, Sühr
et al. [58] considered fairness concerns in ride-hailing platforms and
proposed an online matching algorithm to ensure salary fairness
for the drivers amortized over time. In reciprocal recommendation
problems, the success is measured by the satisfaction of both sides
of the market such as in online dating platforms [44]. We consider
problems where the items have no preferences over the users and
where there are no supply constraints on the items.
One key aspect of fair rankings is the fair division of the exposure
to the users among the items. Fair division [15, 45, 56] has been
studied for decades where the goal is to allocate a set of resources
to the agents. Two of the classic desiderata for fair division are (1)
proportionality i.e. every agent receives its “fair share” of the utility,
and (2) envy-freeness i.e. no agent wishes to swap her allocation
with another agent. In the proposed TSFD Rank, the optimization of
user and item fairness can be thought of as ensuring proportionality
for the users and the items and the optimization for diversity can
be interpreted as reducing the envy of the users.
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3 RANKING IN A TWO-SIDED MARKET
As a basis for our theoretical analysis, as well as the derivation
of our TSFD Rank, we first formalize the problem of intent-aware
ranking in two-sidedmarkets. This includes formalizations of utility,
user fairness, item fairness and diversity.
3.1 Intent-aware Setup and Utility
We consider the problem of ranking a set of items D𝑞 = {𝑑1, 𝑑2,
𝑑3, ...} to present to the users with query 𝑞. A query can be a text
query (e.g. “Schwarzenegger”) or any other context for ranking
(e.g. “featured movies today”). In the intent-aware setup [2, 22, 23],
each user has an unobserved intent 𝑖 ∈ I that further refines the
query (e.g. preferred movie genre). We denote with IU𝑞 the intent
distribution of the user populationU𝑞 for query 𝑞. Each item has
varying relevance to different intents (e.g. a movie has varying
relevance to different genres), and we denote the relevance of an
item 𝑑 to an intent 𝑖 as 𝑟 (𝑑, 𝑖). A wide range of existing methods can
be used to learn this relevance function, and we merely assume that
relevance estimates 𝑟 (𝑑, 𝑖) are available. A ranking 𝜎 is a permuta-
tion of the set of items and a ranking policy 𝜋 (·|𝑞) is a probability
distribution over all possible permutations, where deterministic
ranking policies are a special case. Focusing on additive ranking
metrics, the utility of a ranking policy 𝜋 is
𝑈 (𝜋 |𝑞) = E𝑖∼IU𝑞 ,𝜎∼𝜋 ( · |𝑞)
[ ∑︁
𝑑∈D𝑞
𝑒 (𝜎 (𝑑))𝑟 (𝑑, 𝑖)
]
, (1)
where 𝜎 (𝑑) is the rank of the item 𝑑 and 𝑒 maps this rank to the
exposure 𝑑 will receive in the position-based model [24]. Since a
user has limited attention for each ranking, we assume the total
exposure is bounded i.e. 0 <
∑
𝑚 𝑒 (𝑚) < ∞. While (1) involves
an expectation in the exponential space of rankings, 𝑈 (𝜋 |𝑞) can
equivalently be written in terms of a marginal rank probability
matrix Σ𝜋,𝑞 with
Σ𝜋,𝑞𝑚,𝑛 = E𝜎∼𝜋 ( · |𝑞)
[
1{𝜎 (𝑑𝑚)=𝑛}
]
∀𝑚,𝑛 (2)
where each entry represents the probability of ranking item 𝑑𝑚 at
rank 𝑛 under policy 𝜋
𝑈 (𝜋 |𝑞) = (rU𝑞 )𝑇 Σ𝜋,𝑞e. (3)
rU𝑞 is the vector containing the expected relevance of each item to
the whole user population with rU𝑞𝑚 = E𝑖∼IU𝑞 [𝑟 (𝑑𝑚, 𝑖)], and e is
the exposure vector with e𝑛 = 𝑒 (𝑛). The marginal rank probability
matrix is doubly stochastic [12] since the sum of each row and each
column is 1 i.e.
∑
𝑚 Σ
𝜋,𝑞
𝑚,𝑛 = 1 for all 𝑛 and
∑
𝑛 Σ
𝜋,𝑞
𝑚,𝑛 = 1 for all𝑚.
3.2 User Fairness
Overall utility as defined in Equation (1) reflects an average over
all users. However, different user groups𝑈𝐺 ∈ UG (e.g. male vs.
female users) can have different intent distributions IUG𝑞 for a
query 𝑞, and suboptimal ranking performance for a minority group
may get drowned out. Since group membership is typically not
known for privacy reasons [29], a ranking policy needs to make
sure that it does not unfairly provide disparate levels of utility to
the user groups. We define the utility of a ranking policy 𝜋 for a
user group𝑈𝐺 as the expected utility for the users in this group
𝑈 (𝜋 |𝑈𝐺,𝑞) = E𝑖∼IUG𝑞 ,𝜎∼𝜋 ( · |𝑞)
[ ∑︁
𝑑∈D𝑞
𝑒 (𝜎 (𝑑))𝑟 (𝑑, 𝑖)
]
= (rUG𝑞 )𝑇 Σ𝜋,𝑞e,
(4)
where rUG𝑞 is the vector containing the expected relevance of each
item to the user group 𝑈𝐺 with rUG
𝑞
𝑚 = E𝑖∼IUG𝑞 [𝑟 (𝑑𝑚, 𝑖)]. A fair
ranking ensures that each user group gets an equitable amount of
utility. In economics, the goal of providing an equitable amount of
utility across groups is typically formalized through a social-welfare
function [60], which is maximized to optimize fairness. We adopt
𝑈𝐹 (𝜋 |𝑞) =
∑︁
𝑈𝐺 ∈UG
𝜌
𝑞
𝑈𝐺 𝑓 (𝑈 (𝜋 |𝑈𝐺,𝑞)) (5)
as our class of social welfare functions, where 𝑓 is an increasing
concave function (e.g. log) that encourages the ranking policy to
provide more equatable utility to each user group. 𝑓 can be chosen
based on application requirements. 𝜌𝑞𝑈𝐺 denotes the group propor-
tion of 𝑈𝐺 , i.e. the probability that a user sampled from the whole
user distributionU𝑞 belongs to user group𝑈𝐺 . Since𝑈𝐹 (𝜋 |𝑞) is a
convex combination of concave functions of Σ𝜋,𝑞 , user fairness is a
concave function of Σ𝜋,𝑞 .
Since the intent distribution of the overall user population is a
convex combination of the intent distribution of each user group
IU𝑞 =
∑
𝑈𝐺 ∈UG 𝜌
𝑞
𝑈𝐺IUG𝑞 , user fairness 𝑈𝐹 (𝜋 |𝑞) is a lower
bound of the overall utility in (1) after transformation through
the inverse of the user fairness function 𝑓 −1
𝑓 −1 (𝑈𝐹 (𝜋 |𝑞))
=𝑓 −1 (
∑︁
𝑈𝐺 ∈UG
𝜌
𝑞
𝑈𝐺 𝑓 (𝑈 (𝜋 |𝑈𝐺,𝑞)))
≤𝑓 −1 (𝑓 (
∑︁
𝑈𝐺 ∈UG
𝜌
𝑞
𝑈𝐺𝑈 (𝜋 |𝑈𝐺,𝑞)))
=
∑︁
𝑈𝐺 ∈UG
𝜌
𝑞
𝑈𝐺𝑈 (𝜋 |𝑈𝐺,𝑞))
=
∑︁
𝑈𝐺 ∈UG
𝜌
𝑞
𝑈𝐺 E𝑖∼IUG𝑞 ,𝜎∼𝜋 ( · |𝑞)
[ ∑︁
𝑑∈D𝑞
𝑒 (𝜎 (𝑑))𝑟 (𝑑, 𝑖)
]
=E𝑖∼IU𝑞 ,𝜎∼𝜋 ( · |𝑞)
[ ∑︁
𝑑∈D𝑞
𝑒 (𝜎 (𝑑))𝑟 (𝑑, 𝑖)
]
=𝑈 (𝜋 |𝑞) .
The inequality holds because 𝑓 is concave. This shows that max-
imizing user fairness is maximizing a lower bound of the overall
utility from Equation (1).
3.3 Item Fairness
Fairness to the items is akin to a fair-division problem. Specifically,
items compete for exposure to the users, since exposure is a pre-
requisite for items to derive utility (e.g. revenue) from the ranking.
We adopt the disparate treatment constraints proposed in [54] for
our theoretical and empirical analysis. The disparate treatment con-
straints ensure that each item group gets an amount of exposure
𝐸 (𝜋 |𝐷𝐺,𝑞) that is proportional to its merit𝑀 (𝐷𝐺,𝑞) > 0.
𝐸 (𝜋 |𝐷𝐺𝑚, 𝑞)
𝑀 (𝐷𝐺𝑚, 𝑞) =
𝐸 (𝜋 |𝐷𝐺𝑛, 𝑞)
𝑀 (𝐷𝐺𝑛, 𝑞) ∀𝑚,𝑛 (6)
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The average exposure of an item group is defined as
𝐸 (𝜋 |𝐷𝐺,𝑞) = E𝜎∼𝜋 ( · |𝑞)
[
1
|𝐷𝐺 |
∑︁
𝑑∈𝐷𝐺
𝑒 (𝜎 (𝑑))
]
=
(l𝐷𝐺 )𝑇 Σ𝜋,𝑞e
|𝐷𝐺 |
(7)
where l𝐷𝐺 is the label vector that denotes whether an item belongs
to item group 𝐷𝐺 with l𝐷𝐺𝑚 = 1{𝑑𝑚 ∈𝐷𝐺 } . For the empirical evalua-
tion, we adopt the average relevance of the items in the item group
as the merit function
𝑀 (𝐷𝐺,𝑞) = E𝑖∼IU𝑞
[
1
|𝐷𝐺 |
∑︁
𝑑∈𝐷𝐺
𝑟 (𝑑, 𝑖)
]
. (8)
Finally, to quantify that items also draw utility from the rankings,
we define the utility of an item group 𝐷𝐺 as
𝑈 (𝜋 |𝐷𝐺,𝑞) = E𝑖∼IU𝑞 ,𝜎∼𝜋 ( · |𝑞)
[ ∑︁
𝑑∈𝐷𝐺
𝑒 (𝜎 (𝑑))𝑟 (𝑑, 𝑖)
]
= (l𝐷𝐺 ◦ rU𝑞 )𝑇 Σ𝜋,𝑞e,
(9)
where ◦ is the element-wise product. In the position-based click
model [24], 𝑈 (𝜋 |𝐷𝐺,𝑞) corresponds to the expected clickthrough
rate of the items in item group 𝐷𝐺 under policy 𝜋 .
3.4 Diversity
The original and dominant motivation for diversity in ranking
arises from the uncertainty about the user’s intent [19]. To hedge
against this uncertainty, a diversified ranking aims to provide utility
no matter what the unknown intent of the user is (i.e. extrinsic
diversity [46]). To formalize this goal, we first define the utility of
a ranking 𝜎 with an additive metric analogous to the overall utility
in Equation (1) as
𝑈 (𝜎 |𝑖, 𝑞) =
∑︁
𝑑∈D𝑞
𝑒 (𝜎 (𝑑))𝑟 (𝑑, 𝑖) . (10)
Similar to the user fairness, the diversity 𝐷 (𝜎 |𝑞) of a ranking 𝜎 is
typically quantified using an increasing concave function 𝑔 that
encourages each ranking in the ranking policy to cover multiple
intents [2, 22, 47, 67]
𝐷 (𝜎 |𝑞) = E𝑖∼IU𝑞
[
𝑔(𝑈 (𝜎 |𝑖, 𝑞))
]
. (11)
Consequently, for a ranking policy 𝜋 , the expected diversity is
𝐷 (𝜋 |𝑞) = E𝜎∼𝜋 ( · |𝑞),𝑖∼IU𝑞
[
𝑔(𝑈 (𝜎 |𝑖, 𝑞))
]
. (12)
Diversity and user fairness differ in two fundamental ways. First,
user fairness aggregates over user groups, while diversity aggre-
gates over intents. Second, user fairness amortizes over intents and
draws from 𝜋 as input to the concave function, while diversity
takes the expectation after the concave transformation. This adds
emphasis on optimizing each individual rankings in the diversity
objective. It also implies that 𝐷 (𝜋 |𝑞) cannot be written as a linear
function of Σ𝜋,𝑞 . Furthermore, unlike utility and user fairness, two
ranking policies 𝜋 and 𝜋 ′ that both produce the same marginal rank
probability matrix Σ𝜋,𝑞 = Σ𝜋 ′,𝑞 representation can have different
diversity 𝐷 (𝜋 |𝑞) ≠ 𝐷 (𝜋 ′ |𝑞).
Similar to user fairness, diversity is also a lower bound on the
overall utility from Equation (1) after transformation with the in-
verse function 𝑔−1
𝑔−1 (𝐷 (𝜋 |𝑞)) = 𝑔−1 (E𝑖∼IU𝑞 ,𝜎∼𝜋 ( · |𝑞) [𝑔(𝑈 (𝜎 |𝑖, 𝑞))])
≤ 𝑔−1 (𝑔(E𝑖∼IU𝑞 ,𝜎∼𝜋 ( · |𝑞) [𝑈 (𝜎 |𝑖, 𝑞)]))
= 𝑈 (𝜋 |𝑞).
This indicates that maximizing diversity also maximizes a lower
bound on the overall utility. Diversity maximization can be ex-
pressed as a submodular maximization problem with two matroid
constraints, and we will optimize it using a greedy algorithm [35]
in our experiments. The algorithm is detailed in Appendix B.
4 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the interplay between utility, item fair-
ness, user fairness and diversity. First, we provide worse-case anal-
ysis showing that individual user groups, item groups, or intents
can needlessly receive zero utility if their interests are not explic-
itly represented in the ranking objective. This indicates that user
fairness, item fairness and diversity are fundamentally different
objectives and achieving one of them does not automatically satisfy
another. Second, we develop utility efficiency analysis to show that
achieving one of user fairness, item fairness and diversity might
fail to satisfy the utility efficiency of the others. This suggests the
utility efficiency of the three desiderata are in conflict with each
other and achieving one of them might harm the other two.
4.1 Zero-Utility Analysis
Our zero-utility analysis investigates whether a user group, item
group or intent can receive a utility of zero, even if a non-zero
solution exists. For clarity, we define non-degenerate ranking prob-
lem where non-zero solution exists as the focus of our theoretical
analysis.
Definition 1. (Non-degenerate ranking problem) A ranking prob-
lem represented by a tuple (I, UG, DG, D𝑞 U𝑞, 𝑟 , 𝑒) is non-
degenerate if (1) Every user group has positive group proportion i.e.
∀𝑈𝐺 ∈ UG 𝜌𝑞𝑈𝐺 > 0; (2) Every intent has positive probability mass
in the user intent distribution i.e. ∀𝑖 ∈ I IU𝑞 (𝑖) > 0; (3) For every
intent 𝑖 , there exists an item 𝑑 such that 𝑟 (𝑖, 𝑑) > 0; and (4) For every
item group 𝐷𝐺 , there exists an item 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷𝐺 such that the expected
relevance E𝑖∼IU𝑞 [𝑟 (𝑑, 𝑖)] > 0.
For user groups and item groups, we investigate whether every
group achieves non-zero utility as defined in (4) and (9) under
different policies. For the intents, maximizing diversity encourages
equitable amount of utility among the intents in each individual
rankings. Since each single ranking might not be able to provide
non-zero utility for every intent due to limited number of non-zero
exposure positions, we define the amount of intent covered by a
ranking 𝜎 as ∑︁
𝑖∈{𝑖 |𝑖∈I,𝑈 (𝜎 |𝑖,𝑞)>0}
[
IU𝑞 (𝑖)
]
,
and investigate whether each ranking sampled from a ranking pol-
icy covers the maximum amount of intent covered by any ranking
Fairness and Diversity for Rankings in Two-Sided Markets
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Table 1: Zero-utility analysis summary
Maximize
Worst utility for
a user group
Worst utility for
an item group
Each ranking covers
maximum intent?
Utility 0 0 no
User fairness non-zero 0 no
Item fairness 0 non-zero no
Diversity 0 0 yes
TSFD Rank non-zero non-zero no
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝜎
∑︁
𝑖∈{𝑖 |𝑖∈I,𝑈 (𝜎 |𝑖,𝑞)>0}
[
IU𝑞 (𝑖)
]
.
We present two example theorems for this zero-utility analysis.
Theorem 1 shows that there exist ranking problems where maxi-
mizing overall utility needlessly provides zero utility for some user
groups.
Theorem 1. There exist non-degenerate ranking problems such
that any policy 𝜋 maximizing overall utility 𝑈 (𝜋 |𝑞) has utility
𝑈 (𝜋 |𝑈𝐺,𝑞) = 0 for a user group𝑈𝐺 .
All proofs are provided in the Appendix C. On the other hand,
Theorem 2 says that maximizing user fairness can ensure non-zero
utility for every user group.
Theorem 2. For any non-degenerate ranking problem, there exists
a user fairness function 𝑓 such that if a ranking policy 𝜋 maximizes
user fairness 𝑈𝐹 (𝜋 |𝑞), then every user group has non-zero utility
under 𝜋 .
We summarize the other formal results in Table 1 which are
detailed in Appendix C. For the sake of brevity, we use “maximize
item fairness” to refer to the more appropriately descriptive “max-
imize utility subject to the disparate treatment constraints”. We
provide an intuition of the analysis through the example in Figure 1.
Without loss of generality, we assume the exposure function 𝑒 is
decreasing in the following discussions.
First, maximizing overall utility can lead to zero utility
for a user group, an item group and cover sub-maximum in-
tent. Since items in 𝑑3∗ have strictly larger expected relevance to
the whole user population than all the other items, a ranking policy
that maximizes utility will rank items in 𝑑3∗ over all the other items.
Since there are infinitely many items in 𝑑3∗ and the total exposure
is bounded, they occupy all the exposure and left zero exposure
for the other items. This leads to zero utility for 𝐷𝐺2,𝑈𝐺1, 𝑖1, 𝑖2. If
three positions have non-zero exposure, then there exists a ranking
that cover all the 3 intents while any ranking sampled from the
policy maximizing utility only covers intent 𝑖3.
Second, enforcing item fairness can lead to zero utility for
a user group and cover sub-maximum intent. Similarly, maxi-
mizing item fairness would rank items in 𝑑3∗ over items in 𝑑1∗, 𝑑2∗
and rank items in 𝑑6∗ over items in 𝑑4∗ 𝑑5∗ since items in 𝑑3∗ and
𝑑6∗ have the largest expected relevance within each item group.
This leads to zero utility for𝑈𝐺1, 𝑖1 and 𝑖2.
Third, maximizing user fairness can lead to zero utility
for an item group and cover sub-maximum intent.Again, any
ranking policy that maximizes user fairness would rank items in
𝑑1∗ over items in 𝑑2∗, 𝑑4∗, 𝑑5∗ and rank items in 𝑑3∗ over items in
ρUG1=0.5 i1
ρUG2=0.5
1
1
d11
DG1
i3
0.6
0.4
i2
UG1
UG2
d12 d13
…
d21 d22 d23
…
d31 d32 d33
…
d41 d42 d43
…
d51 d52 d53
…
d61 d62 d63
… d6*
d5*
d4*
d3*
d2*
d1*
DG2
1
1
0.9
1
0.9
0.9
Figure 1: Example illustrating the zero-utility analysis. The
example shows a ranking problem with 2 user groups, 3 in-
tents and 2 item groups. There are 6 sets of items that are par-
titioned into the 2 item groups as indicated by the squares.
Each set consists of countably infinite number of items with
exactly the same relevance to every intent and we denote
with 𝑑𝑚∗ the 𝑚𝑡ℎ set. The numbers on the connections be-
tween user groups and intents represent the intent distribu-
tion. The numbers on the connections between intents and
items represent relevance. For clarity, we omit connections
with 0 probability or 0 relevance.
𝑑6∗ since 𝑑1∗ and 𝑑3∗ have the largest expected relevance for each
user group. This leads to zero utility for 𝐷𝐺2 and 𝑖2.
Fourth, maximizing diversity can lead to zero utility for a
user group and an item group. A ranking policy that maximizes
diversity will rank items in 𝑑1∗ over items in 𝑑4∗, rank items in 𝑑2∗
over items in 𝑑5∗ and rank items in 𝑑3∗ over items in 𝑑6∗ since 𝑑1∗,
𝑑2∗ and 𝑑3∗ are the most relevant for each intent. This leads to zero
utility for item group 𝐷𝐺2. If only one position that has non-zero
exposure, maximizing diversity will always put one item in 𝑑3∗ in
that position. This leads to zero utility for𝑈𝐺1.
This analysis indicates that it is necessary to optimize each of
user fairness, item fairness, and diversity, since any one criterion
does not even provide the guarantee of non-zero utility of the
others.
4.2 Utility Efficiency Analysis
Our utility efficiency analysis investigates if optimizing for one
of user fairness, item fairness, or diversity can provide a utility-
efficient solution for any of the other desiderata. To answer this
kind of questions, we first introduce the utility efficiency for the
user groups, item groups and intents.
For the user groups, we focus on utility Pareto efficiency of rank-
ing policies. We begin by defining a dominance relation between
two policies with respect to a multi-objective optimization problem.
The objectives are the utilities for the user groups𝑈 (𝜋 |𝑈𝐺,𝑞) from
Equation (4).
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Definition 2. (Dominance of ranking policy for user groups) For
a non-degenerate ranking problem, a ranking policy 𝜋 dominates
another ranking policy 𝜋 ′ forUG if𝑈 (𝜋 |𝑈𝐺,𝑞) ≥ 𝑈 (𝜋 ′ |𝑈𝐺,𝑞) for
all 𝑈𝐺 ∈ UG and there exists 𝑈𝐺 ∈ UG such that 𝑈 (𝜋 |𝑈𝐺,𝑞) >
𝑈 (𝜋 ′ |𝑈𝐺,𝑞).
The Pareto efficiency of a ranking policy to the user groups is
then defined as
Definition 3. (Pareto efficiency of ranking policy to the user
groups) For a non degenerate ranking problem, a ranking policy 𝜋 is
Pareto efficient toUG if 𝜋 is not dominated by any ranking policy
𝜋 ′ forUG.
For the intents, since the diversity emphasises on the metric of
each rankings, we analyze the utility Pareto efficiency of rankings
to the intents.
Definition 4. (Dominance of ranking for the intents) For a non-
degenerate ranking problem, a ranking 𝜎 dominates another ranking
𝜎 ′ for I if 𝑈 (𝜎 |𝑖, 𝑞) ≥ 𝑈 (𝜎 ′ |𝑖, 𝑞) for all 𝑖 ∈ I and there exists 𝑖 ∈ I
such that𝑈 (𝜎 |𝑖, 𝑞) > 𝑈 (𝜎 ′ |𝑖, 𝑞).
Definition 5. (Pareto efficiency of ranking to the intents) For a
non-degenerate ranking problem, a ranking 𝜎 is Pareto efficient to I
if 𝜎 is not dominated by any ranking 𝜎 ′ for I.
For the item groups, the ranking policy achieves utility efficiency
when items are ranked by their expected relevance within each
item group.
Definition 6. (Items ranked by expected relevance within each
item group) For a non-degenerate ranking problem and a ranking
policy 𝜋 , the items are ranked by their expected relevance to the whole
user population within each item group under 𝜋 when for any 𝜎
with 𝜋 (𝜎 |𝑞) > 0 and for all 𝐷𝐺 ∈ DG, 𝑑𝑚 ∈ 𝐷𝐺,𝑑𝑛 ∈ 𝐷𝐺 , if
E𝑖∼IU𝑞
[
𝑟 (𝑑𝑚, 𝑖)
]
> E𝑖∼IU𝑞
[
𝑟 (𝑑𝑛, 𝑖)
]
, then 𝑒 (𝜎 (𝑑𝑚)) ≥ 𝑒 (𝜎 (𝑑𝑛)).
Achieving utility efficiency can be interpreted as not picking a
solution that could easily be improved upon. Thus, if a procedure
fails the test of utility efficiency, it clearly provides suboptimal
solution to the user groups, item groups or the intents. We present
two example theorems that characterize the utility efficiency of
optimizing overall utility, user fairness, item fairness, and diversity
on the utility of users, items, and intents. Theorem 3 shows that
maximizing user fairness is Pareto efficient to the user groups.
Theorem 3. For any non-degenerate ranking problem and user
fairness function 𝑓 , if a ranking policy 𝜋 maximizes user fairness
𝑈𝐹 (𝜋 |𝑞), then 𝜋 is Pareto efficient to the user groups.
While the solution is utility-efficient to the user groups, the
following Theorem 4 shows that this solution is not utility-efficient
to the item groups.
Theorem 4. There exists a ranking problem and a user fairness
function 𝑓 such that items are not ranked by the expected relevance
within each item group under any ranking policy 𝜋 that maximizes
user fairness𝑈𝐹 (𝜋 |𝑞).
We summarize the results of our full utility efficiency analysis
in Table 2 and provide the details in Appendix C. Maximizing over-
all utility is the only criterion that ensures utility efficiency for
Table 2: Utility efficiency analysis summary
Maximize
Policy Pareto
efficient to the users?
Items ranked
by relevance?
Ranking Pareto
efficient to the intents?
Utility yes yes yes
User fairness yes no yes
Item fairness no yes no
Diversity no no yes
all groups, but the solutions may be poor in terms of fairness or
diversity as shown in the zero-utility analysis. Once we explicitly
optimize for any one of the fairness or diversity goals, the ranking
policy is generally not utility-efficient for the other goals (except
that maximizing user fairness ensures utility efficiency for the in-
tents). This implies that the utility efficiency of the three goals are
in conflict with each other. Optimizing one of the three desiderata
might cause harm or utility drop of the other two. A fair ranking
algorithm should make sure the harm or utility drop is fairly shared
among different groups.
5 TSFD RANK: OPTIMIZING RANKINGS FOR
FAIRNESS AND DIVERSITY
Driven by the theoretical analysis from the previous section, we
now develop the first ranking algorithm – called TSFD Rank for
Two-Sided Fairness and Diversity – that explicitly accounts for user
fairness, item fairness, and diversity requirements. The algorithm
proceeds in two steps. In the first step, it optimally satisfies item
fairness and user fairness simultaneously through convex optimiza-
tion. In the second step, the algorithm maximizes diversity subject
to the fairness constraints from the first step.
5.1 Step 1: Convex Optimization for Item and
User Fairness
In the first step, we optimize the marginal rank probability matrix
representation Σ of the ranking policy to satisfy both user and item
fairness. As already shown in Section 3, both user fairness and
item fairness can be expressed in terms of Σ, which reduces the
optimization problem from the exponential space of rankings to
the polynomial space of marginal rank probability matrices. This
leads to the following convex optimization problem
argmaxΣ 𝑈𝐹 (Σ|𝑞)
s. t. 1𝑇 Σ = 1𝑇 ,Σ1 = 1,∀𝑖, 𝑗 0 ≤ Σ𝑖, 𝑗 ≤ 1
Σ satisfies item-fairness constraints
(13)
where𝑈𝐹 is the user-fairness objective expressed in terms of the
marginal rank probability matrix Σ and 1 is the vector of 1s. The
item-fairness constraints are represented as constraints of the opti-
mization problem, in addition to the linear constraints that ensure
the marginal rank probability matrix Σ is doubly stochastic. As
long as the fairness objective is concave and the item-fairness con-
straints are linear in Σ, the problem can be solved efficiently by
convex optimization algorithms [14].
5.2 Step 2: Sampling Diverse Rankings
Since we cannot directly sample rankings from Σ, we still need to
derive a ranking policy 𝜋 that has Σ as its matrix of marginal rank
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probabilities. For each matrix Σ, there are typically many different
policies that produce these marginal rank probabilities. Among
those policies, we aim to choose the one that provides maximum
diversity. This can be formulated as the following optimization
problem.
argmax𝜋 𝐷 (𝜋 |𝑞)
s. t. E𝜎∼𝜋 ( · |𝑞)
[
1{𝜎 (𝑑𝑚)=𝑛}
]
= Σ𝑚,𝑛 ∀𝑚,𝑛
(14)
The constraints in this optimization problem correspond to a Birkhoff-
von Neumann (BvN) decomposition [12], for which efficient algo-
rithms exist. These algorithms greedily construct a set of permuta-
tion matrices, each corresponding to a deterministic ranking, such
that their mixture eventually becomes equal to Σ.
With the additional goal in the objective of constructing a policy
that maximizes diversity, we choose the permutation matrices in
each greedy step to maximize diversity. Since finding the permu-
tation matrix with the largest diversity that is satisfiable in Σ is
NP-hard, we start with the permutation matrix that maximizes
utility among the ones that satisfy the conditions of the BvN de-
composition. We then adopt a local search strategy that switches
two items if the switch increases diversity. We also tried more ex-
pensive search strategies that exhaustively search up to position 3
and found the difference to be small. We present the details of the
algorithm in Appendix A and will provide the implementation as
open source.
Note that maximizing diversity reduces the utility variance to the
users across the rankings drawn from 𝜋 . This can be seen as a form
of envy reduction, where envy measures the individual reduction in
utility that a particular user experiences by not drawing the user’s
optimal-utility ranking from 𝜋 . To show this, we derive an upper
bound 𝐷Σ𝜋,𝑞𝑈𝐵 of the diversity as a function of Σ
𝜋,𝑞
𝐷 (𝜋 |𝑞) = E𝜎∼𝜋 ( · |𝑞),𝑖∼IU𝑞
[
𝑔(𝑈 (𝜎 |𝑖, 𝑞))
]
≤ E𝑖∼IU𝑞
[
𝑔(E𝜎∼𝜋 ( · |𝑞) [𝑈 (𝜎 |𝑖, 𝑞)])
]
= E𝑖∼IU𝑞
[
𝑔((r𝑖 )𝑇 Σ𝜋,𝑞e)
]
= 𝐷Σ
𝜋,𝑞
𝑈𝐵
(15)
where r𝑖 is the relevance vector to the intent 𝑖 with r𝑖𝑚 = 𝑟 (𝑑𝑚, 𝑖).
The equality holds when, for each user with a particular intent, the
utility for that intent is the same across the rankings sampled from
the ranking policy — which means that there is no envy of a user
that receives a particular ranking to the other rankings that could
have been sampled.
Note that the upper bound is determined by Σ𝜋,𝑞 , which is op-
timized in the first step. The second step maximizes diversity to
match this upper bound, which can be interpreted as reducing the
envy of the users. This also illustrates a value judgment in the
design of TSFD Rank, where we optimize user and item fairness
as the primary criteria, and diversity as a secondary one. This is
also reflected in Table 1, where our method is shown to guarantee
non-zero utility to the user and item groups, but not necessarily to
cover maximum amount of intent.
6 EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
In addition to the theoretical characterizations, we now evaluate
empirically in how far different ranking algorithms affect user
fairness, item fairness and diversity on a movie recommendation
dataset.
6.1 Dataset
We constructed the first benchmark dataset that provides intent,
user group, and item group annotations. For the items, we col-
lected 100 movies from different genres {Romance(20), Comedy(25),
Action(25), Thriller(15), Sci-Fi(15)} as the intent set, and lead by
different races {black-lead(20), white-lead(80)} as the item group
set. The relevance of a movie to a genre is the average user rating
on IMDB1 if the movie belongs to that genre and 0 otherwise. To
fully leverage the range of the ratings, we subtract the minimum
rating 6 in the dataset from all the ratings to get the relevance. For
the users, we regard male and female as two user groups and set
the user proportion 𝜌𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 ∈ [0, 1] as 0.6 by default and 𝜌 𝑓 𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 =
1 − 𝜌𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 . To enable varying the intent similarity between the two
user groups, we arbitrarily construct two dissimilar intent distri-
butions I1 = [0.5, 0.5, 0, 0, 0] and I2 = [0, 0, 0.5, 0.25, 0.25] over the
five genres. We use an intent similarity factor 𝑠 ∈ [0, 1] (0.5 by de-
fault) to control the intent similarity between the two user groups
I𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 = (1 − 0.5𝑠)I1 + 0.5𝑠I2 and I𝑓 𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 = (1 − 0.5𝑠)I2 + 0.5𝑠I1.
6.2 Experiment Setup
All results are averaged over 5,000 samples (50,000 samples for
the results in Table 3), where each sample consists of 15 randomly
selected movies to be ranked. To make sure all the methods are
within the domain of the functions while there is a clear trade-
off, we set the user fairness function as 𝑓 (·) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔(· − 0.6) and
the diversity function as 𝑔(·) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔(· + 0.0001). To control the
exposure steepness, we set the exposure function as 𝑒 (·) = ( 1· )𝜂
with 𝜂 (default 𝜂 = 1). For all experiments, we use the default
parameters introduced in this section unless we explicitly state
there is a change.
We compare 5 policies in the empirical evaluation. The policies
that maximize item fairness, user fairness and TSFD Rank are all
solved by first a convex optimization to satisfy fairness goals and
then the greedy BvN decomposition algorithm to optimize diver-
sity. We use the greedy submodular optimization algorithm with
two matroid constraints to maximize diversity [35]. To avoid cases
where the item fairness constraints can not be satisfied, we optimize
the one-sided disparate treatment constraints proposed in [55] in
the experiments.
For clarity of presentation, we bring user fairness, diversity and
the upper bound on diversity after the convex optimization step
(diversity UB) on the same scale as overall utility by applying the
inverse of user fairness function and diversity function to each
of them to get 𝑓 −1 (𝑈𝐹 (𝜋 |𝑞)), 𝑔−1 (𝐷 (𝜋 |𝑞)) and 𝑔−1 (𝐷Σ𝜋,𝑞𝑈𝐵 ) with
𝑓 −1 (·) = 𝑒 · + 0.6 and 𝑔−1 (·) = 𝑒 · − 0.0001. Item unfairness is the
amount of violation of the one-sided disparate treatment constraints
max(0, 𝐸 (𝜋 |𝐷𝐺1)𝑀 (𝐷𝐺1,𝑞) −
𝐸 (𝜋 |𝐷𝐺2)
𝑀 (𝐷𝐺2,𝑞) ) with𝑀 (𝐷𝐺1, 𝑞) ≤ 𝑀 (𝐷𝐺2, 𝑞).
1https://www.imdb.com/
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Figure 2: The effects of user intent similarity, user group proportion, extrinsic bias to an item group, exposure steepness and
number of intents on the item groups, user groups and intents.
Table 3: performance of different ranking algorithms2
Maximize
Measure Utility Item unfairness User fairness Diversity Diversity UB
Utility 1.518 0.186 1.447 1.016 1.016
Item fairness 1.509 0.000 1.437 1.010 1.013
User fairness 1.498 0.193 1.476 1.052 1.062
Diversity 1.428 0.185 1.390 1.214 1.214
TSFD Rank 1.489 0.000 1.466 1.045 1.055
6.3 Empirical Results
How do different methods trade-off between user fairness,
item fairness, diversity and utility?We show the empirical re-
sults with the default setup in Table 3. As expected, the ranking algo-
rithms that consider only one of the measures aces in that measure
but achieves sub-optimal performance on the other ones. In con-
trast, the proposed TSFD Rank explicitly controls all desiderata by
sacrificing some utility to achieve perfect item fairness, second-best
user fairness and third-best diversity (very close to the second-best).
The diversity upper bound provides a skyline of howmuch diversity
TSFD Rank can possibly achieve. So the small difference between
the diversity achieved by the policy that maximizes item fairness,
the policy that maximizes user fairness, the policy produced by
TSFD Rank and their respective diversity upper bound shows that
the greedy BvN decomposition algorithm achieves diversity very
close to the upper bound.
How do user intent similarity, user group proportion, and
exposure steepness affect user fairness? Figure 2 (a) (b) (c) show
the effect of the three factors on the utility ratio between female
and male user groups 𝑈𝑓 𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑈𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 =
𝑈 (𝜋 |𝑓 𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒,𝑞)
𝑈 (𝜋 |𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒,𝑞) , which measures
the utility difference between the two user groups. For the policy
that maximizes user fairness, the minority (female) group gets a
smaller ratio of utility as the intent similarity decreases. The ratio
also decreases as the male group proportion increases, and it stays
flat with varying exposure steepness. This is expected since the
2The standard error of each value presented in the table is smaller than 0.001.
user fairness objective gives larger weight for the majority group
but is oblivious to exposure steepness. The proposed TSFD Rank
achieves almost the same ratio as the policy maximizing only user
fairness, which shows its effectiveness on fairly distributing the
utility drop due to the other desiderata between the two user groups.
The policies that maximize item fairness or overall utility amplify
the utility drop of the minority (female) user group more than TSFD
Rank. The policies that maximize diversity sometimes amplify the
utility drop while sometimes over-correcting it.
How do extrinsic bias and exposure steepness affect item
fairness? Biased relevance estimates, which might come from
biased data, can contribute to unfair exposure allocation to the
items [54]. To simulate the bias, for each black-lead movie 𝑑 of
genre 𝑖 , we set the biased relevance as 𝑟𝑏 (𝑑, 𝑖) = (1 + 𝑏)𝑟 (𝑑, 𝑖)
where 𝑏 is the bias level to the black-lead movies. The results with
varying bias are shown in Figure 2 (d). The policy maximizing item
fairness ensures roughly a linear change in exposure ratio as the
bias increases, which is expected since the exposure ratio is a linear
function of the average relevance of black-lead movies, which in
turn is a linear function of the bias level 𝑏. The proposed TSFD
Rank achieves similar exposure ratio as the policy maximizing
item fairness, while all the other methods lead to undesirable over-
amplifications of the bias towards the less represented black-lead
movies.
Figure 2 (e) shows that when the exposure steepness increases,
both TSFD Rank and the policy maximizing item fairness manage to
control the winner-takes-all dynamics while all the other methods
fail to ensure an equitable amont of exposure to the less represented
black-lead movies.
How do the number of intents and exposure steepness af-
fect diversity? The diversity ratio 𝑔−1 (𝐷)/𝑔−1 (?ˆ?∗) = 𝑔−1 (𝐷 (𝜋 |𝑞))
𝑔−1 (?ˆ?∗)
and the user fairness ratio 𝑓 −1 (𝑈𝐹 )/𝑓 −1 (𝑈𝐹 ∗) = 𝑓 −1 (𝑈𝐹 (𝜋 |𝑞))
𝑓 −1 (𝑈𝐹 ∗)
measure how far a policy deviates from the policies that optimize
each desideratum where𝑈𝐹 ∗ is the user fairness achieved by the
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policy maximizing user fairness and ?ˆ?∗ is the diversity achieved
by optimizing diversity by the greedy submodular approximation
algorithm. Figure 2 (f) shows that as the number of intents gets
larger, maximizing diversity gets further away from maximizing
user fairness. Figure 2 (g) and (h) show that as the number of in-
tents gets larger and as the exposure distribution gets steeper, the
policies that satisfy other desiderata deviate further from the policy
maximizing diversity. These results combined with previous empir-
ical analysis show that maximizing diversity fails to achieve user
or item fairness and vice versa. That TSFD Rank achieves the third-
best diversity is expected, since it prioritizes fairness over diversity
and only considers diversity in the second step when the marginal
rank probability matrix representation Σ𝜋,𝑞 of the ranking policy
with a sub-optimal diversity upper bound is already determined.
7 CONCLUSION
We analyzed the interplay between user fairness, item fairness and
diversity for rankings in two-sided markets and found that they
are three independent and conflicting goals. Driven by the analysis,
we proposed TSFD Rank, the first ranking algorithm that explicitly
enforces user fairness, item fairness and diversity. TSFD Rank can
optimally satisfy user fairness and item fairness through convex
optimization and then optimize diversity subject to the fairness
constraints via a greedy BvN decomposition algorithm. Empirical
results on a movie recommendation dataset confirm that TSFD
Rank can effectively and robustly control the three desiderata.
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A GREEDY BIRKHOFF-VON NEUMANN DECOMPOSITION ALGORITHM TO SAMPLE DIVERSE
RANKINGS
To instantiate the second step of TSFDRank, we propose a greedy algorithm (Algorithm 1) for Birkhoff-vonNeumann (BvN) decomposition [12]
with two search strategies (Algorithm 2, 3 ) to maximize diversity. The algorithm greedily constructs a permutation that optimizes diversity
each step until the mixture eventually becomes equal to the marginal rank probability matrix. The steps to finding a maximum matching
can be solved by polynomial-time maximum flow algorithms and to finding a perfect matching that maximizes utility can be solved by
polynomial-time Minimum-Cost Flow algorithms [34]. Since the matrix is doubly stochastic, We can always find a perfect matching each
step [12]. Since we eliminate at least one non-zero entry in Σ each step, the number of permutations in the policy 𝜋 is at most |D𝑞 |2 . We
show the comparison of different strategies under the default setup described in Section 6 on the movie dataset in Tabel 4. ES denotes
exhaustive search, LSI denotes local search with utility maximizing ranking initialization and LSNI denotes local search without utility
maximizing ranking initialization. The diversity upper bound might not be achieved by any ranking policy since we are constrained to
sample rankings from the matrix. Nevertheless, the diversity of all algorithms still achieve diversity very close to the upper bound. There is
little difference between different strategies. We adopted local search with initialization in all the other experiments.
Table 4: Comparison of different BvN decomposition algorithms
ES level 0 (Random) ES level 1 ES level 2 ES level 3 LSI LSNI Upper Bound
Diversity 1.04421 1.04430 1.04430 1.04431 1.04430 1.04415 1.05531
Algorithm 1: Greedy Algorithm for BvN decomposition to optimize Diversity
input :A ranking problem 𝑅𝑃
A diversity function 𝑔
A marginal rank probability matrix Σ
A string s-type: whether to use the exhaustive search or the local search strategy
An integer l: the level of the exhaustive search strategy
A Boolean init: whether to initialize with utility maximizing ranking or not in the local search strategy
output :A ranking policy 𝜋
initialization: ∀𝜎 𝜋 (𝜎 |𝑞) = 0
while Σ! = 0 do
Construct a bipartite graph 𝐺 with items and positions as vertices.
for each non-zero element Σ𝑚,𝑛 of Σ do
Create an edge for item 𝑑𝑚 and position 𝑛 in 𝐺 .
end
if s-type is “exhaustive” then
𝜎 = Exhastive-Search-Match(RP, g, G, l)
else
𝜎 = Local-Search-Match(RP, g, G, init)
end
𝜋 (𝜎 |𝑞) =𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑚Σ𝑚,𝜎 (𝑑𝑚)
for each item 𝑑𝑚 do
Σ𝑚,𝜎 (𝑑𝑚) = Σ𝑚,𝜎 (𝑑𝑚) − 𝜋 (𝜎 |𝑞)
end
end
return 𝜋
B GREEDY APPROXIMATION ALGORITHM FOR SUBMODULAR OPTIMIZATION OF DIVERSITY
A ranking that maximizes diversity can constitute a deterministic ranking policy that maximizes the expected diversity. The problem
of finding a ranking that maximizes diversity can be formulated as follows. Denote the set of all positions as L = {1, 2, 3, ..., 𝑁 } and all
assignments of one item to a position asA = D ×L. The diversity optimization problem is
argmax𝜎⊆A 𝐷 (𝜎 |𝑞)
s. t. Each product shows up at most once in 𝜎 .
Each position shows up at most once in 𝜎 .
(16)
In submission,
,
Lequn Wang and Thorsten Joachims
Algorithm 2: Exhaustive-Search-Match(RP,g, G,l)
input :A ranking problem 𝑅𝑃
A diversity function 𝑔
A bipartite graph 𝐺
An integer l.
output :A ranking 𝜎
initialization: 𝜎∗ = 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒 , 𝐷∗ = −∞, N = |D𝑞 |
if l = 0 then
return a random maximum matching 𝜎 of 𝐺 .
else
Construct a sub-graph 𝑆𝐺 of 𝐺 with all the items, positions in {1, 2, ..., 𝑙} as vertices and the edges between them.
Find all maximum matchings𝑀𝑆𝐺 of 𝑆𝐺 .
for each matching𝑀 in𝑀𝑆𝐺 do
Construct a sub-graph 𝑆𝐺 ′ of 𝐺 by deleting vertices in𝑀 from 𝐺 .
Find a maximum matching𝑀 ′ of 𝑆𝐺 ′.
if the number of edges |𝑀 ′ | in𝑀 is 𝑁 − 𝑙 then
Construct a ranking 𝜎 by combining𝑀 and𝑀 ′. if 𝐷 (𝜎 |𝑞) > 𝐷∗ then
𝐷∗, 𝜎∗ = 𝐷 (𝜎 |𝑞), 𝜎
end
end
end
return 𝜎∗
end
Algorithm 3: Local-Search-Match(RP, g, G, init)
input :A ranking problem 𝑅𝑃 and a diversity function 𝑔
A bipartite graph 𝐺 and a Boolean init.
output :A ranking 𝜎
if init=0 then
𝜎∗ = find a random maximum matching of 𝐺 .
else
𝜎∗ = find a perfect matching of 𝐺 that maximizes utility.
end
changed = True
while changed do
changed = False
for 𝑑𝑚 inD𝑞 do
for 𝑑𝑛 inD𝑞 do
if (𝑑𝑛 , 𝜎∗ (𝑑𝑚)) and (𝑑𝑚 , 𝜎∗ (𝑑𝑛)) ∈ G then
Construct 𝜎 ′ by switching 𝑑𝑚 and 𝑑𝑛 in 𝜎∗
if 𝐷 (𝜎 ′ |𝑞) > 𝐷 (𝜎∗ |𝑞) then
𝜎∗ = 𝜎 ′
changed = True
end
end
end
end
end
return 𝑟∗
𝐷 (·|𝑞) : 2A → R is monotone submodular. The two constraints are two partition matroid constraints. The problem is generally NP-hard
but a simple greedy approximation algorithm enjoys 13𝐷
∗ performance guarantee and works much better than that in practice [35]. The
gredy algorithm executes as follows: starting with the empty set of 𝜎0 = {}, the greedy algorithm greedily selects an item-position pair inA
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that does not violate the two constraints but maximizes diversity
𝜎𝑚 := 𝜎𝑚−1 ∪ { argmax
𝑎∈A,𝜎𝑚−1∪{𝑎}satisfies the two constraints
[𝐷 (𝜎𝑚−1 ∪ {𝑎}|𝑞)]}. (17)
The resulting assignment set 𝜎 |D𝑞 | constitutes a ranking that has diversity at least 13𝐷∗.
C THEOREMS
We provide the proofs of all the theorems in the main paper in this section. For clarity, we present some related definitions here even when
they are already presented in the main paper.
Definition 7. (Ranking problem) Any intent set I, user group setUG, item group setDG, item setD𝑞 , user distributionU𝑞 , relevance
function 𝑟 and exposure function 𝑒 for a query 𝑞 constitute a ranking problem (I, UG, DG, D𝑞 U𝑞 , 𝑟 , 𝑒) if |I| > 0, |UG| > 0, |DG| > 0,
|D𝑞 | > 0 .
The utility of a ranking 𝜎 to a user group𝑈𝐺 , an item group 𝐷𝐺 and an intent 𝑖 are defined as
𝑈 (𝜎 |𝑈𝐺,𝑞) = E𝑖∼IUG𝑞
[ ∑︁
𝑑∈D𝑞
𝑒 (𝜎 (𝑑))𝑟 (𝑑, 𝑖)
]
(18)
𝑈 (𝜎 |𝐷𝐺,𝑞) = E𝑖∼IU𝑞
[ ∑︁
𝑑∈𝐷𝐺
𝑒 (𝜎 (𝑑))𝑟 (𝑑, 𝑖)
]
(19)
𝑈 (𝜎 |𝑖, 𝑞) =
∑︁
𝑑∈D𝑞
𝑒 (𝜎 (𝑑))𝑟 (𝑑, 𝑖) (20)
The utility of a ranking policy 𝜋 to a user group𝑈𝐺 , item group 𝐷𝐺 and an intent 𝑖 are defined as
𝑈 (𝜋 |𝑈𝐺,𝑞) = E𝜎∼𝜋 ( · |𝑞) [𝑈 (𝜎 |𝑈𝐺,𝑞)] (21)
𝑈 (𝜋 |𝐷𝐺,𝑞) = E𝜎∼𝜋 ( · |𝑞) [𝑈 (𝜎 |𝐷𝐺,𝑞)] (22)
𝑈 (𝜋 |𝑖, 𝑞) = E𝜎∼𝜋 ( · |𝑞) [𝑈 (𝜎 |𝑖, 𝑞)] (23)
Definition 8. (Zero/non-zero utility under a ranking) Denote 𝐺 as an item group, a user group or an intent. For a ranking problem, 𝐺 has
non-zero utility under ranking 𝜎 if𝑈 (𝜎 |𝐺,𝑞) > 0 and has zero utility under ranking policy 𝜎 if𝑈 (𝜎 |𝐺,𝑞) = 0.
Definition 9. (Zero/non-zero utility under a ranking policy) Denote𝐺 as an item group, a user group or an intent. For a ranking problem,𝐺
has non-zero utility under ranking policy 𝜋 if𝑈 (𝜋 |𝐺,𝑞) > 0 and has zero utility under ranking policy 𝜋 if𝑈 (𝜋 |𝐺,𝑞) = 0.
Definition 10. (Non-zero optimal utility under a ranking policy) Denote𝐺 as an item group, a user group or an intent. For a ranking problem,
𝐺 has non-zero optimal utility if there exists a ranking policy 𝜋 such that 𝐺 has non-zero utility under 𝜋 .
Definition 11. (Amount of intent covered by a ranking) For a ranking problem, the amount of intent covered by a ranking 𝜎 is∑︁
𝑖∈{𝑖 |𝑖∈I,𝑈 (𝜎 |𝑖,𝑞)>0}
[
IU𝑞 (𝑖)
]
.
Definition 12. (Maximum amount of intent covered by any ranking) For a ranking problem, the maximum amount of intent covered by any
ranking is
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝜎
∑︁
𝑖∈{𝑖 |𝑖∈I,𝑈 (𝜎 |𝑖,𝑞)>0}
[
IU𝑞 (𝑖)
]
Definition 13. (Dominance of ranking) LetG represent a partitioning by either user groups, item groups, or intents. For a ranking problem, a
ranking 𝜎 dominates another ranking 𝜎 ′ forG if𝑈 (𝜎 |𝐺,𝑞) ≥ 𝑈 (𝜎 ′ |𝐺,𝑞) for all𝐺 ∈ G and there exists𝐺 ∈ G such that𝑈 (𝜎 |𝐺,𝑞) > 𝑈 (𝜎 ′ |𝐺,𝑞).
Definition 14. (Dominance of ranking policy) LetG represent a partitioning by either user groups, item groups, or intents. For a ranking
problem, a ranking policy 𝜋 dominates another ranking policy 𝜋 ′ forG if𝑈 (𝜋 |𝐺,𝑞) ≥ 𝑈 (𝜋 ′ |𝐺,𝑞) for all 𝐺 ∈ G and there exists 𝐺 ∈ G such
that𝑈 (𝜋 |𝐺,𝑞) > 𝑈 (𝜋 ′ |𝐺,𝑞).
Definition 15. (Pareto Efficiency of ranking) LetG represent a partitioning by either user groups, item groups, or intents. For a ranking
problem, a ranking 𝜎 is Pareto efficient toG if 𝜎 is not dominated by any ranking policy 𝜎 ′ forG.
Definition 16. (Pareto Efficiency of ranking policy) Let G represent a partitioning by either user groups, item groups, or intents. For a
ranking problem, a ranking policy 𝜋 is Pareto efficient toG if 𝜋 is not dominated by any ranking policy 𝜋 ′ forG.
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Definition 17. (Items ranked by expected relevance within each item group) For a ranking problem and a ranking policy 𝜋 , the items are
ranked by their expected relevance to the whole user population within each item group under 𝜋 when for any 𝜎 with 𝜋 (𝜎 |𝑞) > 0 and for all
𝐷𝐺 ∈ DG, 𝑑𝑚 ∈ 𝐷𝐺,𝑑𝑛 ∈ 𝐷𝐺 , if E𝑖∼IU𝑞
[
𝑟 (𝑑𝑚, 𝑖)
]
> E𝑖∼IU𝑞
[
𝑟 (𝑑𝑛, 𝑖)
]
, then 𝑒 (𝜎 (𝑑𝑚)) ≥ 𝑒 (𝜎 (𝑑𝑛)).
Definition 18. (Non-degenerate ranking problem) A ranking problem is non-degenerate if (1) Every user group has positive group proportion
i.e. ∀𝑈𝐺 ∈ UG𝜌𝑞𝑈𝐺 > 0; (2) Every intent has positive probability mass from the overall user intent distribution i.e. ∀𝑖 ∈ IIU𝑞 (𝑖) > 0; (3) For
every intent 𝑖 , there exists an item 𝑑 such that 𝑟 (𝑖, 𝑑) > 0; and (4) For every item group 𝐷𝐺 , there exists an item 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷𝐺 such that the expected
relevance E𝑖∼IU𝑞 [𝑟 (𝑑, 𝑖)] > 0.
Definition 19. (Satisifiable Disparate treatment constraints) For a non-degenerate ranking problem and a merit function 𝑀 , we say the
disparate treatment constraints with merit function𝑀 is satisfiable for the ranking problem if there exists a ranking policy 𝜋 that satisfies the
disparate treatment constraints for the ranking problem.
As [55] pointed out, there exists degenerate cases where the disparate treatment constraints are not satisfiable for a ranking problem.
C.1 Maximizing Utility
C.1.1 Zero-utility Analysis of maximizing utility.
Theorem 5. (Maximizing overall utility can lead to 0 utility for a user group.) There exists a non-degenerate ranking problem such that the
policy 𝜋 maximizing the overall utility has utility𝑈 (𝜋 |𝑈𝐺,𝑞) = 0 for a user group𝑈𝐺 .
Proof. Proof by construction. We first construct a ranking problem as illustrated in Figure 1. I = {𝑖1, 𝑖2, 𝑖3}, UG = {𝑈𝐺1,𝑈𝐺2},
𝜌𝑈𝐺1 = 0.5 and 𝜌𝑈𝐺2 = 0.5, IUG1 (𝑖1) = 0.6, IUG1 (𝑖2) = 0.4, IUG2 (𝑖3) = 1, IUG1 (𝑖3) = IUG2 (𝑖1) = IUG2 (𝑖2) = 0, UG = {𝐷𝐺1, 𝐷𝐺2}
𝑑𝑚∗ = {𝑑𝑚1, 𝑑𝑚,2 ...𝑑𝑚,∞} for𝑚 ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}.D𝑞 = ∪𝑚𝑑𝑚∗, 𝐷𝐺1 = 𝑑1∗ ∪ 𝑑2∗ ∪ 𝑑3∗, 𝐷𝐺2 = 𝑑4∗ ∪ 𝑑5∗ ∪ 𝑑6∗. 𝑟 (𝑑1∗, 𝑖1) = 𝑟 (𝑑2∗, 𝑖2) = 0. We
denote with 𝑟 (𝑑𝑚∗, 𝑖) = · as all the items in 𝑑𝑚∗ has relevance · to intent 𝑖 . 𝑟 (𝑑1∗, 𝑖1) = 𝑟 (𝑑2∗, 𝑖2) = 𝑟 (𝑑3∗, 𝑖3) = 1, 𝑟 (𝑑4∗, 𝑖1) = 𝑟 (𝑑5∗, 𝑖2) =
𝑟 (𝑑6∗, 𝑖3) = 0.9. All the other item-intent pair has zero relevance. We will show that𝑈𝐺1 has zero utility in any utility maximizing policy 𝜋
while it has non-zero optimal utility. Without loss of generality, we assume the exposure function 𝑒 is a decreasing function of the position.
First, 𝑈𝐺1 has non-zero optimal utility since any ranking that allocates an item in 𝑑1∗, 𝑑2∗, 𝑑3∗, 𝑑4∗ in a non-zero exposure position will
have non-zero utility for 𝑈𝐺1. There must be at least one position that has non-zero exposure since the total exposure is positive and the
positions are countable.
Second, in any policy 𝜋 that maximizes utility, items in 𝑑3∗ take all the exposure and all the other items have zero exposure. Since items
in 𝑑3∗ have the largest expected relevance E𝑖∼IU [𝑟 (𝑑,𝑖) ] than the other items, they occupy the highest exposure positions in any ranking
sampled from 𝜋 . If not, we can switch the items to get a ranking with larger utility which contradicts the assumption that 𝜋 maximizes
utility. Thus the sum of the exposure of the items in 𝑑3∗ is
∞∑︁
𝑛=1
E𝜎∼𝜋 ( · |𝑞)
[
𝑒 (𝜎 (𝑑3𝑛))
]
=
∞∑︁
𝑛=1
E𝜎∼𝜋 ( · |𝑞)
[
𝑒 (𝑛)
]
=
∞∑︁
𝑛=1
𝑒 (𝑛) (24)
which is the total exposure. So all the other items get 0 exposure.
Since only items in 𝑑3∗ annd 𝑑6∗ have non-zero relevance to𝑈𝐺2 but they all get 0 exposure, the utility for 𝐷𝐺2 is zero. □
Theorem 6. (Maximizing overall utility can lead to 0 utility for an item group.) There exists a non-degenerate ranking problem such that the
policy 𝜋 maximizing the overall utility has utility𝑈 (𝜋 |𝐷𝐺,𝑞) = 0 for an item group 𝐷𝐺 .
Proof. Proof by construction. We still use the example in Figure 1 that was detailed in the Proof of Theorem 5. We will show that 𝐷𝐺2
has zero utility in any utility maximizing policy 𝜋 while it has non-zero optimal utility.
First, 𝐷𝐺2 has non-zero optimal utility since any ranking that allocates an item in 𝐷𝐺2 in a non-zero exposure position will have non-zero
utility for 𝐷𝐺2. Second, as shown in the Proof of Theorem 5, in any policy 𝜋 that maximizes utility, items in 𝑑3∗ take all the exposure and all
the other items have zero exposure. Since items in 𝐷𝐺2 have zero exposure, the utility for 𝐷𝐺2 is zero. □
Theorem 7. (Maximizing overall utility cannot ensure each ranking sampled from the policy covers the maximum amount of intent covered
by any ranking.) There exists a non-degenerate ranking problem such that the amount of intent covered by any ranking sampled from the policy
maximizing the overall utility is less than the maximum amount of intent covered by any ranking.
Proof. Proof by construction. We still use the example in Figure 1 that was detailed in the Proof of Theorem 5. If there are at least 3
positions that have non-zero exposure, then the maximum amount of intent covered by any ranking is 1 since we can select 3 items relevant
to different intents and put them to 3 non-zero exposure positions. We will show that the policy maximizing utility will only cover 𝑖3. As
shown in the Proof of Theorem 5, in any policy 𝜋 that maximizes utility, items in 𝑑3∗ take all the exposure and all the other items have
zero exposure. Since items relevant to 𝑖1 and 𝑖2 have zero exposure, 𝑖1 and 𝑖2 have zero utility. The amount of intent covered by the policy
maximizing utility is only 0.5 which is less than 1. □
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Figure 3: Examples to prove the theorems. Numbers on the connections between user groups and intents represent the intent
distribution. The numbers of the connections between intents and items represent relevance. For clarity, we omit connections
with 0 probability or relevance.
C.1.2 Efficiency Analysis of maximizing utility.
Theorem 8. (The policy maximizing the overall utility is Pareto efficient to the user groups.) For any non-degenerate ranking problem, if a
ranking policy 𝜋 maximizes the overall utility, then 𝜋 is Pareto efficient to the user groups.
Proof. Proof by contradiction. Assume there exists a ranking policy 𝜋 such that 𝜋 maximizes the utility i.e. ∀𝜋 ′ 𝑈 (𝜋 ′ |𝑞) ≤ 𝑈 (𝜋 |𝑞) and 𝜋
is not Pareto efficient to the user groups. By the definition of Pareto efficiency, there exists a ranking policy 𝜋 ′′ such that 𝜋 ′′ dominates 𝜋 for
the user groups. By the definition of dominance,
𝑈 (𝜋 ′′ |𝑞) −𝑈 (𝜋 |𝑞) =
∑︁
𝑈𝐺 ∈UG
𝜌
𝑞
𝑈𝐺 (𝑈 (𝜋 ′′ |𝑈𝐺,𝑞) −𝑈 (𝜋 |𝑈𝐺,𝑞)) > 0
which contradicts the assumption that 𝜋 maximizes the utility. □
Theorem 9. (Items are ranked by their expected relevance within each item group in the policy maximizing the overall utility.) For any
non-degenerate ranking problem, if a ranking policy 𝜋 maximizes the overall utility, then items are ranked by their expected relevance to the
whole user population within each item group under 𝜋 .
Proof. If there is a ranking 𝜎 with 𝜋 (𝜎 |𝑞) > 0 and items are not ranked by their expected relevance within each item group, we can
construct a new ranking 𝜎 ′ by switching one pair of items that are not ranked by their expected relevance within each item group so that
𝑈 (𝜎 ′ |𝑞) > 𝑈 (𝜎 |𝑞). We can replace 𝜎 with 𝜎 ′ in the ranking policy 𝜋 to construct a new ranking policy 𝜋 ′ with larger overall utility. This
contradicts that 𝜋 maximizes utility. □
Theorem 10. (Maximizing utility ensures each ranking sampled from the policy is Pareto efficient to the intents.) For any non-degenerate
ranking problem, if a ranking policy 𝜋 maximizes the overall utility, then for any ranking 𝜎 with 𝜋 (𝜎 |𝑞) > 0, 𝜎 is Pareto efficient to the intents.
Proof. First, each ranking sampled from the policy 𝜋 maximizing utility is a ranking maximizing utility. Otherwise, we can replace it
with a ranking maximizing utility in the ranking policy to get a policy with larger utility. We only need to prove that any ranking that
maximizes utility is Pareto efficient among the rankings.
Proof by contradiction. Assume there exists a ranking 𝜎 such that 𝜎 maximizes the utility i.e. ∀𝜎 ′ 𝑈 (𝜎 ′ |𝑞) ≤ 𝑈 (𝜎 |𝑞) and 𝜎 is not Pareto
efficient to the intents. By the definition of Pareto efficiency, there exists a ranking 𝜎 ′′ such that 𝜎 ′′ dominates 𝜎 for the intents. By the
definition of dominance,
𝑈 (𝜎 ′′ |𝑞) −𝑈 (𝜎 |𝑞) = E𝑖∼IU𝑞
[
𝑈 (𝜎 ′′ |𝑖, 𝑞) −𝑈 (𝜎 |𝑖, 𝑞)
]
> 0
which contradicts the assumption that 𝜎 maximizes the utility. □
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C.2 Maximizing user fairness
C.2.1 Zero-utility analysis of maximizing user fairness.
Theorem 11. (Maximizing user fairness can ensure non-zero utility for all user groups.) For any non-degenerate ranking problem, there
always exists a user fairness function 𝑓 such that if a ranking policy 𝜋 maximizes user fairness, then every user group has non-zero utility under
𝜋 .
Proof. First, there always exists a ranking policy that has non-zero utility for each user group (e.g. the mixture of the ranking policies
that maximize utility for each user group).
Second, for any ranking policy 𝜋 that has non-zero utility for every user group, we can construct a user fairness function 𝑓 such that any
ranking policy 𝜋 ′ where at least one user group has zero utility has smaller user fairness than 𝜋 . Without loss of generality, we denote
𝑈𝐺1 one of the user groups that has zero utility under 𝜋 ′. Denote the maximum utility of a user group over all user groups and all ranking
policies as 𝑈UG𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑈𝐺 ∈UG,𝜋 ′′𝑈 (𝜋 ′′ |𝑈𝐺,𝑞) and the minimum utility of a user group across all user groups under policy 𝜋 as
𝑈UG𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝜋 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑈𝐺 ∈UG𝑈 (𝜋 |𝑈𝐺,𝑞). The increasing concave function 𝑓 is constructed as a piece-wise linear function
𝑓 (·) =
{
𝑘1 (· − 𝑡1) if · ≤ 𝑡1
𝑘2 (· − 𝑡1) if · > 𝑡1
with 𝑘1 𝑘2 𝑡1 to be set later. We want to show that𝑈𝐹 (𝜋 |𝑞) > 𝑈𝐹 (𝜋 ′ |𝑞)
𝑈𝐹 (𝜋 |𝑞) −𝑈𝐹 (𝜋 ′ |𝑞)
=
∑︁
𝑈𝐺 ∈UG
𝜌𝑈𝐺 𝑓 (𝑈 (𝜋 |𝑈𝐺,𝑞)) −
∑︁
𝑈𝐺 ∈UG
𝜌𝑈𝐺 𝑓 (𝑈 (𝜋 ′ |𝑈𝐺,𝑞))
=𝜌𝑈𝐺1 [𝑓 (𝑈 (𝜋 |𝑈𝐺1, 𝑞)) − 𝑓 (𝑈 (𝜋 ′ |𝑈𝐺1, 𝑞))] +
∑︁
𝑈𝐺 ∈UG\𝑈𝐺1
𝜌𝑈𝐺 [𝑓 (𝑈 (𝜋 |𝑈𝐺,𝑞)) − 𝑓 (𝑈 (𝜋 ′ |𝑈𝐺,𝑞))]
≥𝜌𝑈𝐺1 [𝑓 (𝑈UG𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝜋 ) − 𝑓 (0)] +
∑︁
𝑈𝐺 ∈UG\𝑈𝐺1
𝜌𝑈𝐺 [𝑓 (𝑈UG𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝜋 ) − 𝑓 (𝑈UG𝑚𝑎𝑥 )]
≥𝜌𝑈𝐺1𝑈UG𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝜋𝑘1 + (1 − 𝜌𝑈𝐺1 ) (𝑈UG𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝜋 −𝑈UG𝑚𝑎𝑥 )𝑘2 (assume 𝑡1 = 𝑈UG𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝜋 , 𝑘2 > 0, 𝑘1 > 0)
(25)
We set 𝑡1 = 𝑈UG𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝜋 𝑘2 to be any positive real number, 𝑘1 > 𝑚𝑎𝑥 (𝑘2,
(1−𝜌𝑈𝐺1 ) (𝑈UG𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑈UG𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝜋 )
𝜌𝑈𝐺1𝑈
UG
𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝜋
𝑘2) so that𝑈𝐹 (𝜋 |𝑞) > 𝑈𝐹 (𝜋 ′ |𝑞).
Since if a ranking policy has zero utility for a user group then the ranking policy has smaller user fairness than 𝜋 using user fairness
function 𝑓 , every user group has non-zero utility in the policy maximizing user fairness. □
Theorem 12. (Maximizing user fairness can lead to zero utility for an item group.) There exists a non-degenerate ranking problem such that
for any user fairness function 𝑓 , the policy 𝜋 maximizing user fairness has utility𝑈 (𝜋 |𝐷𝐺,𝑞) = 0 for an item group 𝐷𝐺 .
Proof. Proof by construction. We use the example in Figure 1 that was detailed in the Proof of Theorem 5. We will show that 𝐷𝐺2 has
zero utility under the policy maximizing user fairness no matter what increasing concave user fairness function 𝑓 we choose.
For any increasing concave user fairness function 𝑓 , the policy maximizing user fairness will always rank items in 𝑑1∗ over items in 𝑑2∗,
𝑑4∗, 𝑑5∗ since items in 𝑑1∗ have strictly larger expected relevance to user group𝑈𝐺1 all the four sets have zero utility for𝑈𝐺2. If not, we can
switch the items to get larger user fairness. Similarly, they policy maximizing user fairness will rank items in 𝑑3∗ over items in 𝑑6∗. Since
there are infinite number of items in 𝑑1∗, 𝑑3∗ and the total exposure is bounded, they occupy all the exposure.∑︁
𝑚∈{1,3}
∞∑︁
𝑛=1
E𝜎∼𝜋 ( · |𝑞)
[
𝑒 (𝜎 (𝑑𝑚,𝑛))
]
=
∞∑︁
𝑛=1
𝑒 (𝑛) (26)
And all the other items get 0 exposure. Since items in 𝐷𝐺2 get 0 exposure, they have zero utility. □
Theorem 13. (Maximizing user fairness cannot ensure each ranking sampled from the policy maximizing user fairness covers the maximum
amount of intent covered by any ranking.) There exists a non-degenerate ranking problem such that for any user fairness function 𝑓 , the amount
of intent covered by any ranking sampled from the policy maximizing user fairness is less than the maximum amount of intent covered by any
ranking.
Proof. Proof by construction. We use the example in Figure 1 that was detailed in the Proof of Theorem 5. If there are at least 3 positions
that have non-zero exposure, then the maximum amount of intent covered by any ranking is 1 since we can select 3 items relevant to
different intents and put them to 3 non-zero exposure positions. We will show that the policy maximizing user fairness will only cover 𝑖1
and 𝑖3. As shown in the Proof of Theorem 12, for any increasing concave user fairness function 𝑓 , the policy maximizing user fairness will
always rank items in 𝑑1∗ over items in 𝑑2∗, 𝑑4∗, 𝑑5∗ and rank items in 𝑑3∗ over items in 𝑑6∗. Thus items in 𝑑2∗ and 𝑑5∗ get zero exposure. So
intent 𝑖2 has zero utility. As a result, any ranking will cover less intent than the maximum amount of intent covered by any ranking. □
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C.2.2 Efficiency analysis of maximizing user fairness.
Theorem 14. (The policy maximizing user fairness is Pareto efficient to the user groups.) For any non-degenerate ranking problem and user
fairness function 𝑓 , if a ranking policy 𝜋 maximizes user fairness, then 𝜋 is Pareto efficient to the user groups.
Proof. Proof by contradiction. Assume there exists a ranking policy 𝜋 such that 𝜋 maximizes the user fairness i.e.∀𝜋 ′𝑈𝐹 (𝜋 ′ |𝑞) ≤ 𝑈𝐹 (𝜋 |𝑞)
and 𝜋 is not Pareto efficient to the user groups. By the definition of Pareto efficiency, there exists a ranking policy 𝜋 ′′ such that 𝜋 ′′ dominates
𝜋 for the user groups. By the definition of dominance and the increasing property of 𝑓 ,
𝑈𝐹 (𝜋 ′′ |𝑞) −𝑈𝐹 (𝜋 |𝑞) =
∑︁
𝑈𝐺 ∈UG
𝜌
𝑞
𝑈𝐺 (𝑓 (𝑈 (𝜋 ′′ |𝑈𝐺,𝑞)) − 𝑓 (𝑈 (𝜋 |𝑈𝐺,𝑞))) > 0
which contradicts the assumption that 𝜋 maximizes the user fairness. □
Theorem 15. (Maximizing user fairness ensures each ranking sampled from the policy is Pareto efficient to the intents.) For any non-degenerate
ranking problem and any user fairness function 𝑓 , if a ranking policy 𝜋 maximizes user fairness, then for any ranking 𝜎 with 𝜋 (𝜎 |𝑞) > 0, 𝜎 is
Pareto efficient to the intents.
Proof. Proof by contradiction. For any policy 𝜋 that maximizes user fairness, assume there exists a ranking 𝜎 such that 𝜋 (𝜎 |𝑞) > 0 while
𝜎 is not Pareto efficient to the intents. By the definition of Pareto efficiency, there exists a ranking 𝜎 ′ that dominates 𝜎 for the intents. We
construct a new ranking policy 𝜋 ′ by replacing 𝜎 with 𝜎 ′. By the definition of dominance and the increasing property of 𝑓 ,
𝑈𝐹 (𝜋 ′ |𝑞) −𝑈𝐹 (𝜋 |𝑞)
=
∑︁
𝑈𝐺 ∈UG
𝜌
𝑞
𝑈𝐺 (𝑓 (𝑈 (𝜋 ′ |𝑈𝐺,𝑞)) − 𝑓 (𝑈 (𝜋 |𝑈𝐺,𝑞)))
=
∑︁
𝑈𝐺 ∈UG
𝜌
𝑞
𝑈𝐺 (𝑓 (E𝑖∼IUG𝑞 ,𝜎∼𝜋 ′ ( · |𝑞) [𝑈 (𝜎 |𝑖, 𝑞)]) − 𝑓 (E𝑖∼IUG𝑞 ,𝜎∼𝜋 ( · |𝑞) [𝑈 (𝜎 |𝑖, 𝑞)]))
>0
□
which contradicts the assumption that 𝜋 maximizes the user fairness.
Theorem 16. (Items are not ranked by their expected relevance within each item group in the policy maximizing the overall utility.) There
exists a non-degenerate ranking problem and a user fairness function 𝑓 , such that items are not ranked by their expected relevance within each
item group in any policy 𝜋 that maximizes user fairness.
Proof. Proof by construction. We first construct a ranking problem shown in Figure 3 example 2.UG = {𝑈𝐺1,𝑈𝐺2}, 𝜌𝑈𝐺1 = 𝜌𝑈𝐺2 = 0.5,
I = {𝑖1, 𝑖2}, IUG1 (𝑖1) = IUG2 (𝑖2) = 1 and IUG1 (𝑖2) = IUG2 (𝑖1) = 0. DG = {𝐷𝐺1}, D𝑞 = {𝑑1, 𝑑2} and 𝑑1, 𝑑2 ∈ 𝐷𝐺1. 𝑟 (𝑑1, 𝑖1) = 1,
𝑟 (𝑑2, 𝑖2) = 0.9 𝑟 (𝑑1, 𝑖2) = 𝑟 (𝑑2, 𝑖1) = 0.
Without loss of generality, we assume 𝑒 (1) > 𝑒 (2). Since there is only one item group, the policy that ensures items are ranked by their
expected relevance within each item group is a deterministic ranking policy that ranks 𝑑1 over 𝑑2.
We take a look at the user fairness of a ranking policy 𝜋 ,
𝑈𝐹 (𝜋 |𝑞)
=
∑︁
𝑈𝐺 ∈UG
𝜌
𝑞
𝑈𝐺 𝑓 (𝑈 (𝜋 |𝑈𝐺,𝑞))
=
∑︁
𝑈𝐺 ∈UG
𝜌
𝑞
𝑈𝐺 𝑓 (E𝜎∼𝜋 ( · |𝑞),𝑖∼IUG
[ ∑︁
𝑑∈D𝑞
𝑒 (𝜎 (𝑑))𝑟 (𝑑, 𝑖)
]
)
=0.5𝑓 (E𝜎∼𝜋 ( · |𝑞)
[
𝑒 (𝜎 (𝑑1))
]
) + 0.5𝑓 (E𝜎∼𝜋 ( · |𝑞)
[
0.9𝑒 (𝜎 (𝑑2))
]
)
There are two possible rankings for this ranking problem and we denote the probability of the ranking that ranks 𝑑1 overs over 𝑑2 in the
ranking policy as 𝑥 . As long as the deterministic ranking policy is not optimal for user fairness under the exposure function 𝑒 and the the
user fairness function 𝑓 , the ranking policy that maximizes the user fairness does not ensure items are ranked by their expected relevance
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within each item group. For example, if we use the 𝑙𝑜𝑔 function as 𝑓 , then the user fairness is
𝑈𝐹 (𝜋 |𝑞)
=0.5𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑒 (1)𝑥 + 𝑒 (2) (1 − 𝑥)) + 0.5𝑙𝑜𝑔(0.9𝑒 (1) (1 − 𝑥) + 0.9𝑒 (2)𝑥)
=0.5𝑙𝑜𝑔((𝑒 (1)𝑥 + 𝑒 (2) (1 − 𝑥)) (0.9𝑒 (1) (1 − 𝑥) + 0.9𝑒 (2)𝑥))
=0.5𝑙𝑜𝑔(0.9(−(𝑒 (1) − 𝑒 (2))2𝑥2 + (𝑒 (1) − 𝑒 (2))2𝑥 + 𝑒 (1)𝑒 (2)))
≤0.5𝑙𝑜𝑔(0.225(𝑒 (1) − 𝑒 (2))2)
and the equality holds when 𝑥 = 0.5. So the ranking policy that maximizes user fairness selects the two rankings with equal probability.
As a result, the items are not ranked by their expected relevance to the whole user population within each item group under the policy
maximizing user fairness. □
C.3 Maximizing utility subject to disparate treatment constraints
For the sake of brevity, we use “maximize item fairness” to refer to the more appropriately descriptive “maximize utility subject to the
disparate treatment constraints”.
C.3.1 Zero-utility analysis of maximizing item fairness.
Theorem 17. (Maximizing item fairness can ensure non-zero utility for all item groups.) For any non-degenerate ranking problem, there
always exists a merit function𝑀 such that if a ranking policy 𝜋 maximizes utility subject to the disparate treatment constraints, then every item
group has non-zero utility under 𝜋 .
Proof. We construct a merit function𝑀 such that every item group has the same merit. First, there always exists a ranking policy that
satisfies the constraints since the policy that ranks items randomly satisfy the policy. Second, any ranking policy that assigns zero exposure
to an item group does not satisfy the constraints. Thus the ranking policy that maximizes utility subject to the constraints have non-zero
utility for all item groups. □
Theorem 18. (Maximizing item fairness can lead to zero utility for a user group.) There exists a non-degenerate ranking problem such that for
any merit function𝑀 , the policy 𝜋 maximizing utility subject to the disparate treatment constraints has utility𝑈 (𝜋 |𝑈𝐺,𝑞) = 0 for a user group
𝑈𝐺 .
Proof. Proof by construction. We use the example in Figure 1 that was detailed in the Proof of Theorem 5. We will show that𝑈𝐺1 has
zero utility under the policy maximizing item fairness no matter what merit function we choose.
For any merit function, the policy maximizing item fairness will always rank items in 𝑑3∗ over items in 𝑑1∗, 𝑑2∗ and rank items 𝑑6∗ over
items in 𝑑4∗, 𝑑5∗. Since there are infinite number of items in 𝑑3∗ and 𝑑6∗ and the total exposure is bounded, they occupy all the exposure∑︁
𝑚∈{3,6}
∞∑︁
𝑛=1
E𝜎∼𝜋 ( · |𝑞)
[
𝑒 (𝜎 (𝑑𝑚,𝑛))
]
=
∞∑︁
𝑛=1
𝑒 (𝑛) (27)
And all the other items get 0 exposure. Since items that have non-zero relevance to 𝑖1 and 𝑖2 get zero exposure,𝑈𝐺1 gets 0 utility. □
Theorem 19. (Maximizing item fairness cannot ensure each ranking sampled from the policy covers the maximum amount of intent covered
by any ranking.) There exists a non-degenerate ranking problem such that for any merit function𝑀 , the amount of intent covered by any ranking
sampled from the policy maximizing utility subject to the disparate treatment constraints is less than the maximum amount of intent covered by
any ranking.
Proof. Proof by construction. We use the example in Figure 1 that was detailed in the Proof of Theorem 5. If there are at least 3 positions
that have non-zero exposure, then the maximum amount of intent covered by any ranking is 1 since we can select 3 items relevant to
different intents and put them to 3 non-zero exposure positions. We will show that 𝑖1 and 𝑖2 have zero utility under the policy maximizing
item fairness no matter what merit function we choose.
As shown in the Proof of Theorem 18, for any merit function, items have non-zero relevance to 𝑖1 and 𝑖2 get zero exposure under the
policy maximizing item fairness. As a result 𝑖1 and 𝑖2 have zero utility. So any ranking sampled from the policy maximizing item fairness has
zero utility for 𝑖1 and 𝑖2. Thus any ranking sampled from the policy maximizing item fairness covers less intent than the maximum amount
of intent covered by any ranking. □
C.3.2 Efficiency analysis of maximizing item fairness.
Theorem 20. (Maximizing item fairness ensures items are ranked by their relevance within each item group) For any non-degenerate ranking
problem and any satisfiable merit function𝑀 , if a ranking policy 𝜋 maximizes utility subject to the disparate treatment constraints, then items
within each item group are ranked by their expected relevance within each item group under 𝜋 .
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Proof. For any ranking policy that maximizes item fairness and any two items within the same group, they must be ranked by their
expected relevance to the whole user population. If not, we can switch the two items without affecting the exposure of any item group and
thus still satisfying the constraints and achieve larger utility which contradicts that the policy is a solution to maximizing utility subject to
the constraints. □
Theorem 21. (Maximizing item fairness is not Pareto efficient to the user groups) There exists a non-degenerate ranking problem and a merit
function𝑀 such that any policy 𝜋 that maximizes utility subject to the disparate treatment constraints is not Pareto efficient to the user groups.
Proof. Consider the example 3 in Figure 3. The only policy that is Pareto efficient to the user groups is the one that maximizes utility for
user group 𝐺1 which is a deterministic ranking policy that ranks 𝑑1 over 𝑑2. We can construct a merit function𝑀 (𝐷𝐺1) = 1,𝑀 (𝐷𝐺2) = 0.9
and exposure function 𝑒 (1) = 1 𝑒 (2) = 0.5 such that the disparate treatment constraints can only be satisfied when the ranking policy also
ranks 𝑑2 over 𝑑1 sometimes. Thus the policy that maximizes utility subject to the constraints is not Pareto efficient to user groups. □
Theorem 22. (Maximizing item fairness does not ensure each ranking sampled from the policy is Pareto efficient to the intents) There exists a
non-degenerate ranking problem and a merit function𝑀 such that for any policy 𝜋 that maximizes utility subject to the disparate treatment
constraints, there exists a ranking 𝜎 with 𝜋 (𝜎 |𝑞) > 0 and 𝜎 is not Pareto efficient to the intents.
Proof. Still consider the example 3 in Figure 3. The only ranking that is Pareto efficient to the intents ranks 𝑑1 over 𝑑2. However, as in
the Proof of Theorem 21, there is a merit function and an exposure function such that the ranking policy must rank 𝑑2 over 𝑑1 sometimes to
achieve the disparate treatment constraints. Thus there always exists a ranking in the policy maximizing item fairness that is not Pareto
efficient to the intents. □
C.4 Maximizing Diversity
C.4.1 Zero-utility analysis of maximizing diversity.
Theorem 23. (Maximizing diversity can ensure each ranking sampled from the policy maximizing diversity covers the maximum amount of
intent covered by any ranking) For any non-degenerate ranking problem, there always exists a diversity function 𝑔 such that if a ranking policy 𝜋
maximizes diversity, then any ranking sampled from 𝜋 covers the maximum amount of intent covered by any ranking.
Proof. Any ranking policy that maximizes diversity consists of rankings that maximize diversity. If not we can replace the rankings that
do not maximize diversity with the ones that maximize diversity to get larger diversity. Denote 𝜎 one ranking that covers the maximum
amount of intent covered by any ranking. We will construct a diversity function 𝑔 such that any ranking 𝜎 ′ that covers smaller amount of
intent than 𝜎 has smaller diversity than 𝜎 . Denote the set of intents covered by 𝜎 and 𝜎 ′ as I𝐶𝜎 and I𝐶𝜎′ . Denote the maximum utility of an
intent over all intents and all rankings as𝑈 I𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖∈I,𝜎′′𝑈 (𝜎 ′′ |𝑖, 𝑞) and the minimum utility of an intent across all intents covered by
𝜎 as𝑈 I𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝜎 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖∈I,𝑈 (𝜎 |𝑖,𝑞)>0𝑈 (𝜎 |𝑖, 𝑞). The increasing concave function 𝑔 is constructed as a piece-wise linear function
𝑔(·) =
{
𝑘3 (· − 𝑡2) if · ≤ 𝑡2
𝑘4 (· − 𝑡2) if · > 𝑡2
with 𝑘3 𝑘4 𝑡2 to be set later. We want to show that 𝐷 (𝜎 |𝑞) > 𝐷 (𝜎 ′ |𝑞).
𝐷 (𝜎 |𝑞) − 𝐷 (𝜎 ′ |𝑞)
=E𝑖∼IU𝑞 [𝑔(𝑈 (𝜎 |𝑖, 𝑞))] − E𝑖∼IU𝑞 [𝑔(𝑈 (𝜎 ′ |𝑖, 𝑞))]
=
∑︁
𝑖∈I𝐶𝜎
IU𝑞 (𝑖) [𝑔(𝑈 (𝜎 |𝑖, 𝑞))] + 𝑔(0) (1 −
∑︁
𝑖∈I𝐶𝜎
IU𝑞 (𝑖)) −
∑︁
𝑖∈I𝐶
𝜎′
IU𝑞 (𝑖) [𝑔(𝑈 (𝜎 ′ |𝑖, 𝑞))] − 𝑔(0) (1 −
∑︁
𝑖∈I𝐶
𝜎′
IU𝑞 (𝑖))
=
∑︁
𝑖∈I𝐶𝜎
IU𝑞 (𝑖) [𝑔(𝑈 (𝜎 |𝑖, 𝑞)) − 𝑔(0)] −
∑︁
𝑖∈I𝐶
𝜎′
IU𝑞 (𝑖) [𝑔(𝑈 (𝜎 ′ |𝑖, 𝑞)) − 𝑔(0)]
≥
∑︁
𝑖∈I𝐶𝜎
IU𝑞 (𝑖) [𝑔(𝑈 I𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝜎 ) − 𝑔(0)] −
∑︁
𝑖∈I𝐶
𝜎′
IU𝑞 (𝑖) [𝑔(𝑈 I𝑚𝑎𝑥 ) − 𝑔(0)]
= 𝑘3𝑈
I
𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝜎
∑︁
𝑖∈I𝐶𝜎
IU𝑞 (𝑖) − 𝑘3𝑈 I𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝜎
∑︁
𝑖∈I𝐶
𝜎′
IU𝑞 (𝑖) − 𝑘4 (𝑈 I𝑚𝑎𝑥 −𝑈 I𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝜎 )
∑︁
𝑖∈I𝐶
𝜎′
IU𝑞 (𝑖) (assume 𝑡2 = 𝑈 I𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝜎𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑘4 > 0𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑘3 > 0)
(28)
We set 𝑡2 = 𝑈 I𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝜎 , 𝑘4 to be any positive real number, 𝑘3 > 𝑚𝑎𝑥 (𝑘4,
(𝑈 I𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑈 I𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝜎 )
∑
𝑖∈I𝐶
𝜎′
IU𝑞 (𝑖)
𝑈 I𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝜎 (
∑
𝑖∈I𝐶𝜎 IU𝑞 (𝑖)−
∑
𝑖∈I𝐶
𝜎′
IU𝑞 (𝑖)) 𝑘4) so that 𝐷 (𝜎 |𝑞) − 𝐷 (𝜎
′ |𝑞) > 0.
Since any ranking that covers smaller amount of intent gets less diversity than 𝜋 , any ranking sampled from any ranking policy that
maximizes diversity will cover the maximum amount of intent covered by any ranking. □
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Theorem 24. (Maximizing diversity can lead to 0 utility for a user group.) There exists a non-degenerate ranking problem such that for any
diversity function 𝑔, the policy 𝜋 maximizing diversity has utility𝑈 (𝜋 |𝑈𝐺,𝑞) = 0 for a user group𝑈𝐺 .
Proof. Consider the example in Figure 3 example 2. No matter what increasing concave diversity function 𝑔 we use, the policy maximizing
diversity will be a deterministic policy that ranks 𝑑1 over 𝑑2. If the first position has non-zero exposure and the second position has zero
exposure, the utility for𝑈𝐺2 is always 0. □
Theorem 25. (Maximizing diversity can lead to zero utility for an item group) There exists a non-degenerate ranking problem such that for
any diversity function 𝑔, the policy 𝜋 maximizing diversity has utility𝑈 (𝜋 |𝐷𝐺,𝑞) = 0 for an item group 𝐷𝐺 .
Proof. Proof by construction. We use the example in Figure 1 that was detailed in the Proof of Theorem 5. We will show that 𝐷𝐺2 has
zero utility under the policy maximizing diversity no matter what increasing concave diversity function 𝑔 we choose.
For any increasing concave diversity function 𝑔, the policy maximizing diversity will always rank items in 𝑑1∗ over items in 𝑑4∗ rank
items in 𝑑2∗ over items in 𝑑5∗ and rank items in 𝑑3∗ over items in 𝑑6∗ since items in 𝑑1∗ 𝑑2∗ and 𝑑3∗ are the most relevant for intents 𝑖1, 𝑖2
and 𝑖3. Since there are infinite number of items in 𝑑1∗, 𝑑2∗, 𝑑3∗ and the total exposure is bounded, they occupy all the exposure.∑︁
𝑚∈{1,2,3}
∞∑︁
𝑛=1
E𝜎∼𝜋 ( · |𝑞)
[
𝑒 (𝜎 (𝑑𝑚,𝑛))
]
=
∞∑︁
𝑛=1
𝑒 (𝑛) (29)
and all the other items get 0 exposure. Since items in 𝐷𝐺2 get 0 exposure, they have zero utility. □
C.4.2 Efficiency analysis of maximizing diversity.
Theorem 26. (Each ranking sampled from the policy maximizing diversity is Pareto efficient to the intents) For any non-degenerate ranking
problem and any diversity function 𝑔, if a ranking policy 𝜋 maximizes diversity, then any ranking 𝜎 with 𝜋 (𝜎 |𝑞) > 0 is Pareto efficient to the
intents.
Proof. Any ranking policy that maximizes diversity consists of rankings that maximize diversity. We only need to prove that if a ranking
maximizes diversity, then it is Pareto efficient to the intents among all the rankings.
Proof by contradiction. Assume there exists a ranking 𝜎 such that 𝜎 maximizes the diversity i.e. ∀𝜎 ′ 𝐷 (𝜎 ′ |𝑞) ≤ 𝐷 (𝜎 |𝑞) and 𝜎 is not Pareto
efficient to the intents. By the definition of Pareto efficiency, there exists a ranking 𝜎 ′′ such that 𝜎 ′′ dominates 𝜎 for the intents. By the
definition of dominance and the increasing property of 𝑔,
𝐷 (𝜎 ′′ |𝑞) − 𝐷 (𝜎 |𝑞) = E𝑖∼IU𝑞
[
𝑔(𝑈 (𝜎 |𝑖, 𝑞)) − 𝑔(𝑈 (𝜎 |𝑖, 𝑞))
]
> 0
which contradicts the assumption that 𝜎 maximizes the diversity. □
Theorem 27. (Maximizing diversity is not Pareto efficient to the user groups) There exists a non-degenerate ranking problem and a diversity
function 𝑔, such that any ranking policy 𝜋 that maximizes diversity is not Pareto efficient to the user groups.
Proof. Consider the example 4 in Figure 3. The only ranking policy that is Pareto efficient to the user groups produces the ranking
(𝑑1, 𝑑2, 𝑑3) deterministically if we set 𝑒 (1) = 1, 𝑒 (2) = 1, 𝑒 (3) = 0. We can always find a diversity fairness function 𝑔 such that 𝑑3 ranks at
position 2 or 1 in the policy maximizing diversity according to Theorem 23. Under this diversity function 𝑔, the policy maximizing diversity
is not Pareto efficient to the user groups. □
Theorem 28. (Items are not ranked by their expected relevance within each item group in the policy maximizing the diversity. ) There exists a
non-degenerate ranking problem and a diversity function 𝑔, such that items are not ranked by their expected relevance within each item group in
any policy that maximizes the diversity.
Proof. Consider the example 4 in Figure 3. If we set 𝑒 (1) = 1, 𝑒 (2) = 1, 𝑒 (3) = 0. We can always find a diversity fairness function 𝑔 such
that 𝑑3 ranks at position 2 or 1 in the policy maximizing diversity according to Theorem 23. Under this diversity function 𝑔, the items are not
ranked by their expected relevance within each item group in any ranking sampled from any policy that maximizes diversity. □
C.5 TSFD Rank
Theorem 29. (TSFD Rank can ensure non-zero utility for all the user groups and item groups) For any non-degenerate ranking problem, there
always exists a user fairness function 𝑓 and a merit function𝑀 such that every user group and item group has non-zero utility under the ranking
policy 𝜋 produced by TSFD Rank.
Proof. First, We construct a merit function𝑀 such that every item group has the same merit. With this merit function, the first step of
TSFD Rank will ensure each item group gets some exposure. In each item group, there exists at least one item that has non-zero relevance
to an intent, otherwise the item group has zero optimal utility. As a result, in each item group, at least one item with non-zero expected
relevance to the whole user population gets some exposure, otherwise we can switch the item with zero expected relevance that gets some
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exposure with an item with non-zero expected relevance that will increase user fairness no matter what user fairness function is. Thus each
item group gets some utility if we use this merit function.
Second, there always exists a ranking policy 𝜋 such that it has non-zero utility for every user group and satisfy the disparate treatment
constraints with merit function 𝑀 . The reason is that since every user group has non-zero optimal utility, there is at least one item has
non-zero relevance to the intent the user has positive probability. We can construct a ranking policy such that this item gets some exposure
and also satisfy the item fairness constraints. Then the convex sum of ranking policies that have non-zero utility for each user group is a
ranking policy that has non-zero utility for every user group.
As shown in the Proof of Theorem 11, for any ranking policy 𝜋 that has non-zero utility for every user group, we can construct a user
fairness function 𝑓 such that no ranking policy with a user group having zero utility has larger user fairness than 𝜋 .
As a result, under the constructed 𝑓 and the disparate treatment constraints with the constructed𝑀 , TSFD Rank always ensures non-zero
utility for every user group and item group. □
Theorem 30. (TSFD Rank cannot ensure each ranking sampled from the policy covers the maximum amount of intent covered by any ranking.
) There exists a non-degenerate ranking problem such that for any user fairness function 𝑓 , merit function𝑀 and diversity function 𝑔, the amount
of intent covered by any ranking sampled from the policy produced by TSFD Rank is less than the maximum amount of intent covered by any
ranking.
Proof. Consider the example 4 in Figure 3. We set 𝑒 (1) = 1, 𝑒 (2) = 1, 𝑒 (3) = 0. No matter what user fairness function, merit function and
diversity function we choose, TSFD Rank always produces the deterministic ranking (𝑑1, 𝑑2, 𝑑3). As a result 𝑖2 has zero utility. So the amount
of intent covered by any ranking produced by TSFD Rank is less than the maximum amount of intent covered by any ranking. □
